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REGULATORY SPACE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 
AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
 
MARKUS WAGNER* 
 
Domestic regulatory decisions involving matters of human health or 
the environment are increasingly coming under scrutiny by international 
courts and tribunals.  One of the latest examples concerns an Australian 
law mandating the plain packaging of cigarettes, which is currently being 
challenged under both international investment and international trade 
law.  Both of these fields are closely related and are governed by similar 
rules.  However, despite their similarities, they also differ in important 
respects.    
This article analyzes the extent of the regulatory space afforded to 
states and World Trade Organization (“WTO”) members in the 
international investment and international trade regimes.  It does so by 
comparing the jurisprudence of investment tribunals regarding 
regulatory expropriations and the jurisprudence of the WTO dispute 
settlement organs in cases concerning human, animal or plant life or 
health, as well as cases concerning technical barriers to trade. 
Additionally, this article suggests that international trade and 
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investment law can offer valuable insights for one another, despite the 
differences between the two regimes.  While international trade law has 
been more adept at incorporating health or environmental concerns as a 
countervailing force to the prevailing paradigm of trade liberalization, 
changes in international investment law may soon close the gap. 
International investment law is currently undergoing a discourse similar 
to the one that has shaped international trade law since the inception of 
the WTO in 1995.  Thus international investment law may be shaped in a 
similar manner, as there are growing signs that the regulatory space 
afforded in international trade and investment law are converging, 
despite the fact that the international trade law discussion was carried out 
in a different context, through a different set of institutions, and within 
different epistemic communities. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The regulation of domestic economic activities was 
traditionally a matter of a state’s regulatory power, subject mostly 
to domestic legal and political constraints.  International legal 
obligations existed to the extent that a state entered into binding 
international obligations to regulate or abstain from regulating 
with respect to particular goods or services.  States entered into 
trade obligations that required them to lower tariff levels in 
exchange for reciprocal benefits that at least part of its constituency 
regarded as important.  Similarly, states concluded treaties that 
provided foreign investors the same treatment accorded to their 
own nationals.  In short, countries had almost unlimited 
“regulatory space.”  They possessed a large degree of regulatory 
autonomy, especially when making decisions that implicated non-
economic values such as human health, human safety, the 
environment or social mobility.  
The situation changed with the adoption of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) 1  after WWII.  The 
GATT provided not only for mechanisms to reduce tariff barriers 
and non-tariff barriers and contained a number of justificatory 
provisions that seemed to afford the contracting parties a great 
deal of regulatory space.  The relative importance of non-tariff 
barriers compared to tariff barriers became evident through a 
growing number of complaints by other GATT parties against 
domestic regulations, arguing that such regulations were in 
contravention of the GATT.2  The establishment of the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) in 1995 accelerated this trend. 3   A 
considerable number of disputes now involve complaints about 
                                                             
1  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 
I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT].  
2  Roy Santana & Lee Ann Jackson, Standards and Non-Tariff Barriers in Trade, 
11 World Trade Rev. 462, 465 et seq. (2012); ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 
344–45 (1993).  
3  Santana & Jackson, supra note 2, at 470; WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
WORLD TRADE REPORT 2012, TRADE AND PUBLIC POLICIES: A CLOSER LOOK AT NON-
TARIFF MEASURES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 39 et seq. (2012). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss1/1
WAGNER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2015  4:03 PM 
2014] REGULATORY SPACE 5 
regulations in the areas of health and the environment.  
The increase in bilateral and multilateral investment 
agreements over the last decades, guaranteeing rights to foreign 
investors, has led to complaints not only against alleged 
expropriations, but also against domestic regulations where no 
property was actually seized.  These so-called regulatory 
expropriations are akin to the “regulatory takings” under domestic 
law in many countries.  Some of the most famous complaints 
include the devaluation of currency, while other complaints 
oppose health and environmental regulations.  Other potential 
areas in which disputes may arise include the regulation of 
antitrust/competition policy, taxation, the sale of securities, 
banking requirements or human rights measures.  
This article explores how the dispute settlement mechanisms in 
both fields struggle with the concept of regulatory space.  It 
contrasts the developments in the areas of trade and investment 
law, although questions concerning regulatory autonomy are not 
limited to these two regimes.  Importantly, investor-state dispute 
settlement has come under increased scrutiny over the last years, 
evidenced not only by public and academic debates, but also by 
some countries reconsidering their commitment to investor-state 
dispute settlement.4  The WTO has undergone similar debates after 
its inception.5  Thus, another aim of the article is to show how the 
WTO’s dispute settlement organs have been able to avoid 
continued debates about the propriety of their jurisprudence.  The 
article analyzes the degree to which the regulatory space afforded 
to governments converges between these two regimes, mainly 
through analyzing disputes concerning health and the 
environment.  These disputes have been highly contentious in the 
trade arena and have taken on great importance in recent 
investment disputes.  
An illustrative example of this convergence is the dispute 
concerning Australia’s legislation concerning the plain packaging 
of cigarettes. 6  The sale of cigarettes in Australia has been under 
                                                             
4  See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. 
5  Daniel C. Esty, The World Trade Organization’s Legitimacy Crisis, 1 World 
Trade Rev. 7 (2002).  
6  The dispute over Australia’s plain packaging law serves illustrative 
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tight restrictions for years.  One of the latest regulations of the sale 
of cigarettes, which went into effect on December 1, 2012, is the 
Tobacco Plain Packaging Act.7  This law imposes strict packaging 
requirements regarding the shape, size, and type of packaging and 
cartons to be used for tobacco products, and even goes as far as 
specifying that the packaging of all tobacco products must be a 
particular color—“drab dark brown”— with a matte finish.8  The 
law also prohibits the use of trademarks or other distinguishing 
characteristics and stipulates that the “brand, business or company 
name, or variant name (if any), for the tobacco products” may only 
appear in a prescribed place and form, alongside any other marks 
permitted by the Act’s regulation.9  The Australian government 
claimed that enacting the legislation was in the interest of 
improving public health.10  It argued that despite the high level of 
regulation in place prior to the enactment of the plain packaging 
law, more than 15,000 Australians die of tobacco-related diseases 
each year, costing AUS$31.5 billion per annum.11 
A challenge against the law’s constitutionality was denied by 
the High Court of Australia in 2012. 12   The law is currently 
                                                             
purposes with respect to the convergence of cases in both the international 
investment law regime and that of the WTO as well as the trend towards 
convergence of regulatory space in both fields.  This article will not fully analyze 
the proceedings under either regime.  On the convergence of the two fields, see 
generally Jürgen Kurtz, On the Evolution and Slow Convergence of International Trade 
and Investment Law, JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2013); Giorgio Sacerdoti, Trade 
and Investment Law: Institutional Differences and Substantive Similarities, 9 JERUSALEM 
REV. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2014); Tomer Broude, Toward an Economic Approach to the 
Consolidation of International Trade Regulation and International Investment Law, 9 
JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 24 (2014); Donald McRae, The World Trade 
Organization and International Investment Law: Converging Systems – Can the Case 
for Convergence Be Made?, JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD.  13 (2014).  
7  Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.).  
8  Id. §§ 18, 19.  
9  Id. §§ 18–20. 
10  Explanatory Memorandum, Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill 2011 (Cth), 1 
(Nicola Roxon, Minister for Health and Ageing) (Austl.), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/download.cgi/cgi-
bin/download.cgi/download/au/legis/cth/bill_em/tppb2011190.pdf.  
11  Id. 
12  JT Int’l SA v. Commonwealth [2012] HCA 43 (Austl.) available at 
http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/judgment-
summaries/2012/projt-2012-08-15.pdf.  The original ruling was made on August 
15, 2012.  For the full judgment made on October 5, 2012, see id. at 1, 6, available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2012/43.html.  
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undergoing scrutiny before two international dispute settlement 
systems:  the WTO and an international investment tribunal.13  In 
the case of the former, a number of WTO members initiated the 
action against Australia.14  In the case of the latter, Philip Morris 
Asia Limited brought a suit against Australia under the Bilateral 
Investment Treaty (“BIT”) between Hong Kong and Australia.15  
Under both processes, the claimants argue, inter alia, that the 
Australian government’s measure infringes trademark rights.16  In 
                                                             
13  See generally the contributions in PUBLIC HEALTH AND PLAIN PACKAGING OF 
CIGARETTES: LEGAL ISSUES (Tania Voon et al. eds., 2012). 
14  It should be noted that with the exception of Cuba and Indonesia, none of 
the complainants are large exporters of tobacco products, and there is little to no 
trade between the applicant countries and Australia.  Sergio Puig, The Merging of 
International Trade and Investment Law, BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 6-30 (forthcoming) 
(draft on file with author).  See generally PUBLIC HEALTH AND PLAIN PACKAGING OF 
CIGARETTES, supra note 13; Dispute Settlement, Australia – Certain Measures 
Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging 
Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WT/DS434 (May 5, 
2014), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds434_e.htm; Dispute 
Settlement, Australia – Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical 
Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and 
Packaging, WT/DS435 (May 5, 2014),  available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds435_e.htm; Dispute 
Settlement, Australia – Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical 
Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and 
Packaging, WT/DS441 (May 5, 2014), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds441_e.htm; Dispute 
Settlement, Australia – Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical 
Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and 
Packaging, WT/DS458 (May 5, 2014), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds458_e.htm; and 
Dispute Settlement, Australia – Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, 
Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco 
Products and Packaging, WT/DS467 (May 5, 2014), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds467_e.htm).  
15  See Letter from Allen Arthur Robinson, Counsel, Philip Morris Asia Ltd., 
to Hon. Robert McClelland MP, Attorney-General for Australia, (Nov. 21, 2011), 
available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0665.pdf (giving a Notice of Arbitration concerning claims made by 
Philip Morris Asia Limited against the Commonwealth of Australia); International 
Center for Trade and Sustainability Development, Morris Launches Legal Battle 
Over Australian Cigarette Packaging, 15 BRIDGES 1  (June 29, 2011) available at 
http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/philip-morris-launches-
legal-battle-over-australian-cigarette-packaging. 
16  In the case of investment law, trademarks are likely considered to be an 
investment under the relevant Hong Kong – Australia BIT.  In the case of WTO 
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addition, the WTO disputes also allege violations of the Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT Agreement”)17 and the GATT 
1994.18   
Regardless of the venue, the cases invariably involve a 
discussion of the ability of governments to regulate in the field of 
human health.19  These cases essentially deal with the amount of 
regulatory space that governments have under both international 
                                                             
law, the applicants claim a violation of Articles 20 and 15(4) of the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) and 
Article 7 of the Paris Convention.  For an instructive overview of intellectual 
property rights in international investment law with specific reference to the plain 
packaging measures of both Australia and Uruguay, see Bryan Mercurio, 
Awakening the Sleeping Giant: Intellectual Property Rights in International Investment 
Agreements, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 871 (2012) and Rochelle Dreyfuss and Susy 
Frankel, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How International Law is 
Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property (New York University School of Law Public 
Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14-53, 1, 24 et 
seq., 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2503135.  
17  Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter 
TBT Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-
tbt.pdf.  This section outlines the pertinent legal questions surrounding the 
regulatory space according to WTO members within disputes concerning the SPS 
Agreement and the TBT Agreement. 
18  Dispute Settlement, Australia – Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, 
Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to 
Tobacco Products and Packaging, WT/DS434 (May 5, 2014), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds434_e.htm.  The 
importance of these proceedings in the WTO context is evidenced by the 
unusually high number of WTO members that have joined the dispute as third 
parties.  See generally Tobacco Plain Packaging – Investor-State Arbitration, 
AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, ATT’Y-GEN. DEP’T, 
http://www.ag.gov.au/tobaccoplainpackaging.  
19  A procedural obstacle to the investment arbitration claim presented by 
Philip Morris Asia consists in the fact that it did not become the sole shareholder 
of Philip Morris Australia Limited until after the government of Australia 
announced that it would proceed with its plain packaging plan.  This likely 
precludes Philip Morris Asia from arguing that it had legitimate expectations that 
its trademarks would not be affected by the plain packaging legislation.  See 
generally AUSTRALIA’S RESPONSE TO THE NOTICE OF ARBITRATION, ¶ 5, (Dec. 21, 2011), 
available at 
http://www.ag.gov.au/Internationalrelations/InternationalLaw/Documents/A
ustralias%20Response%20to%20the%20Notice%20of%20Arbitration%2021%20Dec
ember%202011.pdf.  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss1/1
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trade and investment law. 
In the past, these two fields of international economic law had 
divergent approaches towards the amount of regulatory autonomy 
governments possessed.  This jurisprudential bifurcation has not 
been problematic so far.  However, with the initiation of 
proceedings in two different dispute settlement systems regarding 
the exact same governmental measure, the question of how much 
regulatory space governments should be afforded under each 
international regime takes on crucial importance. 20   One could 
argue that states should foresee situations in which a subsequent 
treaty that allows for less regulatory space supersedes an earlier 
treaty.  However, this assumes that the restrictions on regulatory 
space concern the same subject matter, which is not necessarily the 
case.  The starting point is quite different in the case of trade and 
investment law, although there may be overlap, as the case of plain 
packaging of cigarettes shows.  This may be due to a different 
regulatory regime with respect to the same subject matter, due to 
the two regimes having been designed to be complementary, but it 
turns out that they are not, or – even more problematically – in 
situations in which the rules of one regime undermine the 
application of the other regime.21  
The increasing importance of so-called Global Value Chains 
(GVCs) shows the interdependence of these two fields. 22   As 
pointed out by the 2013 report of the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), because of the inextricable 
                                                             
20  Divergence in the interpretation of different (or even similar) treaty 
language is not a new phenomenon.  Moreover, coherence between different 
international regimes is not required, as the debate on the fragmentation of 
international law shows.  See generally International Law Commission, 
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law: Rep. of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission, at 253, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (Martti Koskenniemi). 
21  One example of the latter concerns countermeasures that are legal under 
WTO law, but are illegal under investment law.  Junianto James Losari & Michael 
Ewing-Chow, Decentralization, Due Process and Disputes: Indonesia's Recent 
Experiences with IIAs and Investor-State Disputes, J. World Inv. & Trade (2015) 
(forthcoming) (on file with author); Puig, supra note 14, at 24. 
22  On global value chains in general, see generally UNCTAD, WORLD 
INVESTMENT REPORT 2013: GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: INVESTMENT AND TRADE FOR 
DEVELOPMENT 122 (2013); IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS FOR TRADE, 
INVESTMENT, DEVELOPMENT AND JOBS, JOINT REPORT BY THE OECD, WTO, & 
UNCTAD 19 (Aug. 6, 2013). 
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linkage between trade and investment in GVCs, “it is crucial to 
ensure coherence between investment and trade policies,” as 
“inconsistent policies weaken the effectiveness of GVC-related 
policies and can ultimately be self-defeating.”23 
Finally, the potential of the two dispute settlement systems to 
decide that countries have different degrees of regulatory 
autonomy may undermine the ability of governments to 
predictably regulate public health and environmental issues.  This 
is especially the case when the disputes involve a challenge to the 
same governmental measure in two systems that do not regulate 
the same subject matter.  Having at least similar regulatory space 
increases efficiency and reduces costs that governments and the 
private sector otherwise incur.  The importance of this matter 
cannot be overstated with respect to the plain packaging 
legislation.  A number of countries plan to institute similar 
regulations to those of Australia and are awaiting the outcome of 
these disputes.24  Even more importantly, the number of cases in 
which the regulatory fabric of countries is being challenged can be 
expected to increase in the near future. 
After briefly discussing the common origins of international trade 
and investment law (2), this article introduces the legal 
frameworks of both regimes and shows that there is a trend 
towards convergence with respect to the regulatory autonomy 
governments have when making public policy decisions (3).  The 
article then provides reasons for the existing differences in how 
both fields approach the question of regulatory autonomy through 
an analysis of the different textual, contextual and institutional 
design, as well as the different epistemic communities prevalent in 
trade and investment law (4).  The final section offers concluding 
remarks (5). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
23  UNCTAD, supra note 22, at 190 et seq. 
24  Sabrina Tavernise, Tobacco Firms’ Strategy Limits Poorer Nations’ Smoking 
Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2013, at A1.  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss1/1
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2. INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW:  TWINS SEPARATED AT BIRTH  
 
Over the last twenty years, the interest in international 
investment law has intensified, shown not only by the increasing 
number of international investment agreements (“IIAs”), but also 
by the increasing number of cases that are being adjudicated.25  
This rising interest is similar to the one observed in international 
trade law, following the creation of the WTO in 1995.  
The two fields are closely interrelated and many modern 
preferential trade agreements contain not only rules with respect to 
trade, but also rules pertaining to investment.26  Examples can be 
found in the ongoing negotiations about the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement (TPP)27 as well as the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP).28  Both areas fall under the 
purview of public international law,29 as the underlying treaties are 
                                                             
25  See infra notes 41 et seq. and accompanying text.   
26  See generally Andreas Dür, Leonardo Baccini & Manfred Elsig, The Design 
of International Trade Agreements: Introducing a New Dataset, R. INT’L ORGS. 1, 6 
(forthcoming 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2141141.  
27  One overview of the current status is provided by the Office of the US 
Trade Representative.  Trans-Pacific Partnership, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/tpp.  The TPP has been the subject of intense 
debate; see generally Paul Krugman, No Big Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2014, at A23.   
28 The TTIP has led to discussions on transparency in treaty negotiations, as 
well as with regard to the inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement.  For 
insight into the former issue, see generally Bernd Lange, TTIP Debate Suffering 
from Lack of Transparency, THE PARLIAMENT (Oct. 31, 2014), 
https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/opinion/ttip-debate-suffering-
lack-transparency.  On the issue of investor-state dispute settlement and the 
impact on the European Commission’s policy space, see generally Javier García 
Olmedo, ISDS: Which Way Will the Scales TTIP?, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Oct. 
3, 2014), available at http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/10/03/isds-
which-way-will-the-scales-ttip/.  
29  Indeed, the first ICSID case appeared to indicate that direction. Asian 
Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, 
Final Award, 526, 557 (June 27, 1990).  See generally Charles N. Brower, W(h)ither 
International Commercial Arbitration, 24 ARB. INT’L 181, 187 (2008); and 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW (Stephan W. Schill 
ed., 2010).  But see Andrea K. Bjorklund, Private Rights and Public International Law: 
Why Competition Among International Economic Tribunals Is Not Working, 59 
HASTINGS L. J. 241, 241–46 (2007).  
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entered into by states.  In both instances, states play a central role 
in the enforcement of adjudicatory decisions. 30   Similarly, both 
entities have seen a remarkable increase in interest: in the case of 
international trade law, this became evident in the aftermath of the 
creation of the WTO in 1995; in the case of international investment 
law, it has grown through a sharp increase in the number of IIAs as 
well as through an increase in dispute settlement based on these 
agreements.31 
There are nevertheless a considerable number of differences.32  
World trade law is based on a set of mostly multilateral treaties 
(with a small number of so-called plurilateral treaties) that prohibit 
discriminatory treatment regarding foreign and domestic like 
goods and services (so-called “national treatment obligation”), and 
also with respect to distinguishing between like products or 
services that come from different countries (so-called “most-
favored nation obligation”).  In the context of the Uruguay Round, 
a number of additional agreements have been developed with 
respect to intellectual property, subsidies, dumping, agriculture, 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and technical barriers to 
trade.  This system is buttressed by a dispute settlement 
mechanism – the Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) – 
often referred to as one of the most effective international 
enforcement mechanisms.  States in WTO disputes oftentimes 
serve as proxies for private actors on both sides of any dispute. 
International investment law is characterized by states 
guaranteeing the protection of foreign investors through rules 
pertaining to fair and equitable treatment, non-discrimination 
based on the origin of the investor and compensation in the case of 
expropriations in exchange for foreign direct investments. 33  
                                                             
30  Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained 
Regimes in International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 483  (2006). 
31  UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEVELOPMENT, WORLD 
INVESTMENT REPORT 2011,  100 (2000).  For a more detailed overview of the 
parallels and differences between the two fields, see generally Puig, supra note 14, 
at 6-13.  
32  See generally Stephan W. Schill, International Investment Law and 
Comparative Public Law – An Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW, 3, 10–17 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010).  
33  THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL 
INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS (Karl P. 
Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009). 
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Contrary to WTO law, there is no need for investors to convince 
their home countries to bring a case, but rather international 
investment treaties allow for the investor to bring a claim against 
the host state, without having to exhaust local remedies, before ad 
hoc arbitral tribunals.  Procedurally, such panels more closely 
resemble commercial arbitration tribunals compared to their WTO 
counterparts.  Investment law is undergoing a marked shift – one 
that is commensurate with a shift in the type of case that is being 
arbitrated.  While early cases mostly concerned expropriation 
measures, or questioned discrete sanctions, investors have started 
to challenge the regulatory fabric of their host states. 34   As a 
corollary, international investment law is becoming increasingly 
scrutinized for being potentially unfair to developing countries or, 
as some have argued, is perceived as a threat to domestic 
governance.  This increased interest is not only true for academic 
writing; 35  international investment law has also gained a 
considerable amount of public attention. 
Di Mascio and Pauwelyn summed up the difference between 
the two regimes by characterizing the trade regime as being about 
“overall welfare, efficiency, liberalization, state-to-state exchanges 
of market access, and trade opportunities—not individual rights.” 
36   In contrast, investment law is concerned with “fairness 
grounded in customary rules on treatment of aliens, not 
efficiency.” 37   Furthermore, “[i]t is about protection, not 
liberalization, and about individual rights, not state-to-state 
exchanges of market opportunities.”38 
The development towards challenging not only particular 
administrative decisions, but also challenging the domestic 
regulatory fabric – and the ability to do so internationally – raises 
                                                             
34 This includes cases concerning higher tariffs for basic utilities, harmful 
substances, or general regulatory policies.  Schill, supra note 32, at 15.  
35  For an excellent overview of the existing literature on international 
investment law and its changing nature, see generally Stephan W. Schill, W(h)ither 
Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of International Investment Law, 22 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 875, 885 (2011).  
36  Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and 
Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT’L L., 
48, 54 (2008). 
37  Id. at 56. 
38  Id. 
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new questions about (1) what role private actors should play, (2) 
what vehicle is appropriate to challenge domestic regulatory 
measures, and (3) to what extent international adjudicatory bodies 
should have decision-making authority over domestic policy 
preferences such as the protection of human health, the 
environment, or human rights.  Although international trade and 
investment law have different enforcement mechanisms, they both 
raise similar questions with respect to the amount of regulatory 
space that is accorded to domestic decision-makers.  Interestingly 
however, these two areas of law appear to have taken divergent 
trajectories regarding this question. 
This article contributes to the nascent literature on comparing 
international trade and investment law.39  Unlike other articles, it 
does not attempt to provide a broad comparison between various 
fields in international law.40  Rather, it presumes that international 
trade and investment law are sufficiently close to warrant a 
meaningful comparison.  This article provides an analysis of the 
regulatory space that states and WTO members are provided when 
                                                             
39  Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the 
Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45 (2013); DiMascio & Pauwelyn, supra 
note 36; Andrew D. Mitchell & Caroline Henckels, Variations on a Theme: 
Comparing the Concept of “Necessity” in International Investment Law and WTO Law, 
14 CHI. J. INT’L L. 93 (2013); Valentina Vadi & Lukasz Gruszczynski, Standards of 
Review in International Investment Law and Arbitration: Multilevel Governance and the 
Commonweal, 16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 613 (2013); Jürgen Kurtz, The Use and Abuse of 
WTO Law in Investor-State Arbitration: Competition and Its Discontents, 20 EUR. J.  
INT’L L. 749 (2009); Diane A. Desierto, Public Policy Design in International 
Investment and Trade Law: Community Expectations and Functional Decision-Making, 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. (2013) available at http://www.nylslawreview.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/16/2013/04/Solving-Global-Problems.CLE-Reading-
Materials.Panel-III.pdf; Elizabeth Trujillo, From Here to Beijing: Public/Private 
Overlaps in Trade and Their Effects on U.S. Law, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 691; Todd Weiler 
& Walid Ben Hamida, Intersections: Dissemblance or Convergence Between 
International Trade and Investment Law, TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
SPECIAL (2013), available at http://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/journal-browse-issues-toc.asp?key=36; Roger P. Alford, The 
Convergence of International Trade and Investment Arbitration (2013), available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?filename=0&article=10
18&context=globalevents&type=additional; RAFAEL LEAL-ARCAS, INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW: MULTILATERAL, REGIONAL, AND BILATERAL 
GOVERNANCE (2010); and TRADE AND INVESTMENT RULE-MAKING: THE ROLE OF 
REGIONAL AND BILATERAL AGREEMENTS (Stephen Woolcock ed., 2006).  
40  Roberts, supra note 39; Julian Arato, The Margin of Appreciation in 
International Investment Law, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 546 (2014). 
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appearing before international investment law panels and WTO 
dispute settlement organs.  The degree of regulatory space 
governments possess is important. On one hand, an abundance of 
regulatory space may undermine the efficacy of the discipline of 
international investment law or international trade law.  On the 
other hand, limiting the regulatory autonomy of governments too 
drastically allows international adjudicators to nullify domestic 
decisions without any form of democratic control.  Given that 
international trade and investment law are closely related, and are 
used to challenge administrative and regulatory decisions, it is 
surprising that there is a disconnect between these two fields with 
respect to the amount of regulatory space that states have at their 
disposal.   
 
3. THE WTO AND INVESTMENT FRAMEWORKS COMPARED 
3.1. Introducing the Legal Frameworks 
 
This section compares the different frameworks that WTO law 
and international investment law employ and highlight important 
differences in the application of the legal frameworks.41  Regime 
comparison is not a particularly novel undertaking, having been 
employed in a number of areas in international law.  Nevertheless, 
some argue that international investment law belongs in a category 
of its own as “[i]t is not a sub-genre of an existing discipline.  It is 
dramatically different from anything previously known in the 
international sphere.”42   While this statement was made in the 
context of a beginning – though quickly burgeoning – practice of 
enforcing investor rights through investment arbitration, 
international investment law is being regarded by a number of 
authors as sui generis.43  Of course, the same was said of the WTO 
                                                             
41  The article is based on an understanding of WTO law and investment law 
as forming part of public international law.  While they may deviate from general 
international law rules in some instances (taking on the character of ius specialis 
under Article 55 of the Articles on State Responsibility), both fields are either 
firmly grounded in public international law or have developed into belonging in 
this field.  Vadi & Gruszczynski, supra note 39, at 617. 
42  Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV. 232, 256 (1995).  
43  Roberts, supra note 39, at 94; Zachary Douglas, The Hybrid Foundations of 
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 74 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT’L LAW 151, 152–53 (2004).  For a 
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after its creation of 1995.44 
Recent developments make such a comparison even more apt. 
A number of trade agreements are now more encompassing, 
including not only provisions pertaining to trade, but also 
provisions pertaining to investment.  Both areas are increasingly 
regarded as two sides of the same coin.45 
This section will outline the basic structures of (a) international 
investment law and (b) international trade law.  Historically 
speaking, both fields are of relatively recent origin.  The WTO’s 
predecessor formed part of the post–WWII attempt to regulate 
international finance, development, and trade through the Bretton 
Woods institutions, and was later supplanted and considerably 
expanded through the creation of the WTO in 1995.  While 
international investment law was created in the aftermath of WWII 
as well, it did not fully form as a more developed field until after 
the end of the Cold War.46  
There are a number of areas where analogies have been drawn 
between international trade and investment law. This has become 
evident in a number of investment cases in which the panels used 
                                                             
counterpoint, see Martins Paparinskis, Analogies and Other Regimes of International 
Law, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRINGING THEORY 
INTO PRACTICE 73, 73 (Zachary Douglas et al. eds., 2014).  
44  Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in International Trade Law, 92 
VA. L. REV. 251, 259 (2006); Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the 
WTO: Rules Are Rules–Toward a More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 335, 341 
(2000). 
45  Some states are including investment protections within bilateral and 
multilateral trade agreements.  For an example, see generally North American 
Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289; Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations [ASEAN] Comprehensive Investment Agreement, Feb. 26, 2009, 
available at 
http://www.asean.org/images/2013/resources/publication/2012%20-
%20ACIA%20An%20Introduction%20(Apr).pdf. Some multilateral trade 
agreements also incorporate provisions on investment.  For examples of such 
agreements, see Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures and General 
Agreement on Trade in Services, 15 April 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994); Debra P. 
Steger, International Trade and Investment: Towards a Common Regime?, in PROSPECTS 
IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 156, 160 et seq. (Roberto Echandi 
& Pierre Sauvé eds., 2013). 
46  José Alvarez, The Once and Future Foreign Investment Regime, in LOOKING 
TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. 
MICHAEL REISMAN 15 (M. Arsanjani et al. eds., 2010) (stating that ”[t]he 1990s, 
not the 1980s and certainly not the 1970s, were the era when the modern 
investment regime was born.”).  
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previous decisions on “likeness” or national treatment or 
procedural decisions on amicus curiae briefs in the WTO context.47 
 
3.1.1. The Investment Law Framework 
 
International investment protection originally developed 
largely in conjunction with trade agreements and oftentimes 
contained provisions that guaranteed wide-ranging protection of 
the property of nationals of one party in the territory of the other 
party. 48   Additional, and sometimes successful, avenues for 
protection included diplomatic protection at the discretion of the 
home state, ad hoc commissions, arbitral tribunals, recourse to 
local courts, or contractual agreements with the host state.49  This 
remained largely unchanged until after WWII.  Until then, the 
protection was based on an emerging body of mostly bilateral 
trade agreements and customary international law.50 
The increasing interchange of capital after WWII, as opposed to 
the previous practice of property protection,51 allowed the field of 
international investment law to emerge.  Capital exporting 
countries, as proxies for capital providers, were however interested 
                                                             
47  Roberts, supra note 39, at 52. See generally the contributions in WTO 
LITIGATION, INVESTMENT ARBITRATION, AND COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Jorge 
Alberto Huerta-Goldman et al. eds., 2013); Alford, supra note 39, at 35 et seq.; 
Trujillo, supra note 39, at 713 et seq.; Kurtz, supra note 39, at 752-55. 
48  DiMascio & Pauwelyn, supra note 36, at 52; Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief 
History of International Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157, 
159 (2005–2006). 
49  Lionel M. Summers, Arbitration and Latin America, 3 CAL. W. INT’L. L.J. 1, 4-
11 (1972).  These measures were almost exclusively ex post facto measures.  For 
further analyses of the history of the protection of the property interests of aliens, 
Douglas, supra note 43, at 151; EDWIN MONTEFIORE BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC 
PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD OR THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS (1916).  
Some of these dispute settlement mechanisms were carried out by mutual 
agreement between the parties, others involved pressure by one of the states 
involved.  ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 9 (2009). 
50  For a more complete history, see NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 49, at 
3-18. 
51  At the time, a conceptual shift is said to have taken place, one from 
protection of property to investment protection, which also took account of the 
need of economic development for developing countries.  Id. at 21.  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
WAGNER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2015  4:03 PM 
18 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 36:1 
in obtaining assurances that investment protection was to be put 
on a more secure footing than the previous mechanisms that were 
oftentimes of an ad hoc nature.  This started with the first BIT, 
which was concluded in 1959 between Pakistan and Germany.52  
The system grew slowly, but steadily from 72 investment 
agreements at the end of the 1960s, to 165 at the end of the 1970s, 
and 385 at the end of the 1980s,53 when a number of European 
countries pursued BITs with developing countries. 54   This was 
partially due to the adoption of the New International Economic 
Order, which signaled a push towards revising the international 
economic system by developing countries.55  It is also worth noting 
that a number of developing countries remained on the sidelines of 
this development.  For example, China did not conclude its first 
BIT until 1982, and neither Brazil nor India did so until 1994.56  The 
real change these treaties brought about came through allowing 
private parties – on the basis of BITs – to have recourse against 
discriminatory treatment, the prohibition of export-related import 
quotas, or the repatriation of income in convertible currencies.  The 
ability to challenge state measures on these grounds was seen as 
the creation of a “dramatic extension of arbitral jurisdiction in the 
international realm.”57 
By the end of the millennium the number of BITs had reached a 
total of 1,857 with other capital exporting countries having 
                                                             
52  Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Nov. 25, 1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 24 (Ger. & 
Pak.). 
53  United Nations Conference on Trade & Development, Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, 1959–1999, 1 (2000), available at 
http://unctad.org/en/docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf. 
54  See generally Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24  
INT’L. LAW. 655, 655 (1990). 
55  See generally G.A. Res. 6/3201, U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-6/3201 (May 1, 1974).  
For an overview of the differing political views of countries, see Andrew T. 
Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 646–51 (1998). 
56  NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 49, at 43–44. 
57  Paulsson, supra note 42, at 233; Christoph Schreuer, Paradigmenwechsel im 
Internationalen Investitionsrecht, PARADIGMENWECHSEL IM VÖLKERRECHT ZUR 
JAHRTAUSENDWENDE 237 et seq. (Waldemar Hummer ed., 2002).  Providing a 
critical view of the system, GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 
AND PUBLIC LAW (2007); DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC 
GLOBALIZATION: INVESTMENT RULES AND DEMOCRACY’S PROMISE (2008).  
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undertaken BIT programs.58  That number grew to just over 2,800 
BITs by the end of 2010.59  Additionally, a considerable number of 
trade agreements contain investment chapters, bringing the total 
number to well over 3,000 instruments.60  Importantly, the number 
of new investment agreements has grown with such rapidity due 
to the fact that they are no longer concluded solely between 
developed and developing countries, as the old boundary between 
capital exporting and capital importing countries has broken 
down. 
Since the first investor-state dispute filed under a BIT in 1987, 
the number of cases has been rising constantly, amounting to 450 
cases by the end of 2011.61  Moreover, according to UNCTAD, 2011 
saw the highest number of cases brought in one year, showing the 
dynamic nature of dispute settlement in this area.  ICSID remains 
the focal point for investor-state arbitration.62 
While investment law was previously confined to being 
grounded in customary international law, 63  it has now firmly 
evolved into a field that is – at least with respect to its basis – 
                                                             
58  See generally KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: 
HISTORY, POLICY, AND INTERPRETATION (2010).  By mid-1996, only Botswana, 
Guatemala, Ireland, Mozambique, Myanmar and Suriname had not concluded a 
BIT.  Guzman, supra note 55, at 640. 
59  United Nations Conference on Trade & Development, supra note 31, at 
100. 
60  Id.  
61  Note that this number may not reflect all disputes submitted under BITs, 
as not all cases are necessarily public.  UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE 
AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT, IIA ISSUES NOTE NO. 1 (Apr. 2012), available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaeia2012d10_en.pdf. 
62  See id. at 2.  For a breakdown of the ICSID cases, see The ICSID Caseload – 
Statistics, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, 7 
(2012), available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&ac
tionVal=ShowDocument&CaseLoadStatistics=True&language=English31. The 
total number of cases registered with ICSID from 1972 until the end of 1996 
amounted to 38.  2011 alone saw 38 newly registered cases with ICSID, with the 
total number of cases between 1997 and 2011 being 331, subsequent to the 
inclusion of provisions into BITs that committed host states to investor–state 
arbitration in the 1990s. 
63  See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 19 
(3d ed. 2010) (“Both views were premised on the idea that law should be designed 
to further the free movement of trade and investments across state boundaries.”).   
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characterized by treaty law.64   The vast majority of investment 
treaties are bilateral – with regional agreements such as the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or sectoral agreements 
such as the Energy Charter Treaty or the Lomé III and IV 
conventions constituting rare exceptions.65  Given the lack of an 
overarching institutional framework,66 it is not surprising that a 
coherent direction is – at least so far – lacking.  Unlike the WTO’s 
Appellate Body (“AB”), 67  investment arbitration panels are not 
guided by the jurisprudence of a higher adjudicatory level.  And 
yet, despite the bilateral nature of the field, there appear to be early 
signs of convergence given that many of the BITs are based on so-
called model BITs which provide – at least for some states – a 
blueprint, with some deviation depending on the country’s 
counterpart.68  Moreover, the vast majority of BITs or multilateral 
investment treaties contain a number of common provisions.  
While the “repetition of common clauses in bilateral treaties does 
not create or support an inference that those clauses express 
customary law,” 69  there is growing evidence that certain 
                                                             
64  See supra Section I.  
65  For an overview of the procedural requirements in these conventions, see 
Paulsson, supra note 42, at 241–54. 
66  Repeated attempts at creating a multilateral investment framework have 
failed.  Rainer Geiger, Regulatory Expropriations in International Law: Lessons from 
the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 94, (2002); EDWARD 
M. GRAHAM, FIGHTING THE WRONG ENEMY: ANTIGLOBAL ACTIVISTS AND 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 15–49 (2000).  
67  Despite the arguably existing hierarchy, panels for a long time have 
deviated considerably from the guidance of the AB in SPS Agreement cases.  See 
Markus Wagner, Law Talk v. Science Talk: The Languages of Law and Science in WTO 
Proceedings, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 151, 194 et seq. (2011). 
68  For the relevant literature, see Schill, supra note 35, at 892 et seq.  See also 
what is arguably a convergence in the model BITs of China and the U.S., albeit 
from different directions, Stephan W. Schill, Tearing Down the Great Wall: The New 
Generation Investment Treaties of the People’s Republic of China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 73 (2007); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Comparison of the 2004 and 1994 U.S. 
Model BITs: Rebalancing Investor and Host Country Interests, in YEARBOOK ON 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 2008–2009, 283 (Karl P. Sauvant, ed., 
2009); Cai Congyan, China–US BIT Negotiations and the Future of Investment Treaty 
Regime: A Grand Bilateral Bargain with Multilateral Implications, 12 J. INT’L. ECON. L. 
457 (2009). 
69  Oscar Schachter, Compensation for Expropriation, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 121, 126 
(1984).  This is not merely an expression of academic sentiment, but was a position 
the ICJ already expressed in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases.  North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases (Fed. Repub. Ger. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss1/1
WAGNER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2015  4:03 PM 
2014] REGULATORY SPACE 21 
fundamental rules and principles can be discerned from the 
existing treaty law and investment jurisprudence.70   
Anthea Roberts helpfully identifies three stages in the 
development of international investment law:  the system’s 
infancy, its adolescence, and its approaching adulthood.71  The first 
stage is characterized by power imbalances between developing 
states and developed states, the latter of which exported its capital 
to the former and could oftentimes dictate the terms of the 
agreement.  While they were reciprocal in nature, in practice the 
large majority of such relationships were characterized by strong 
power imbalances and the belief that only through such treaties 
could developing countries attract much-needed capital. 72 
Investors were given protections from expropriations or other 
measures that could inhibit their investments.  Procedurally, the 
broadly worded obligations were accompanied by mechanisms 
that allowed investors to bring disputes before arbitral tribunals, 
which were given wide discretion to decide over such disputes.  As 
Roberts points out, the “net result was a considerable shift of 
interpretive power away from the treaty parties and toward 
investment tribunals, leading to investment treaty law being 
developed through a body of de facto precedents.” 73   The 
community of arbitrators being small and to a large extent coming 
from commercial arbitration was another characteristic of this 
phase.74  This led to the mindset that was prevalent in commercial 
arbitration (of regarding the two parties as being on equal footing) 
without due regard for the different roles that states and investors 
actually play. 75   Finally, the treaties were structurally skewed 
                                                             
70  See generally STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (2009).  
71  Roberts, supra note 39, at 75–93.  For a slightly different classification, see 
Vandevelde, supra note 48, at 158 et seq.  
72  SORNARAJAH, supra note 63, at 19.  
73  Roberts, supra note 39, at 77. 
74  Additional factors included that arbitral institutions were deeply vested in 
commercial or investor-state contractual arbitration, thus favoring arbitrators with 
whom they were familiar.  Given that these institutions were involved in 
commercial arbitration, it is no surprise that they would choose from among the 
same rosters of arbitrators.  Brower, supra note 29, at 190 et seq.; Thomas W. 
Wälde, The Present State of Research Carried Out by the English–Speaking Section of the 
Centre for Studies and Research, in NEW ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
63, 114–15 (Philippe Kahn & Thomas W. Wälde eds., 2007).  
75  William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, The Need for Public Law 
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towards investor rights and rarely contained solid provisions that 
would safeguard the interests of states in defending regulatory 
changes.  The protection of pursuing domestic policy goals – 
coming to the fore in recent years – was hardly mentioned in these 
treaties. This is understandable, given that the capital-exporting 
country was generally not concerned with such issues in the 
capital-importing country.  The greater concern with investor 
rights becomes evident when looking at some of the early (and 
even today’s) literature that emphasizes the parallel between 
investment law and human rights law. 76   It is important to 
emphasize in this context that – barring certain rights – such rights 
are not absolute, but in most instances are subject to limitations.77  
In a number of cases, panels found that – based on the assumption 
that investment treaties exist to “create and maintain favorable 
conditions for investments,” – resolution of uncertainties should 
result “so as to favor the protection of covered investments.”78  
                                                             
Standards of Review in Investor-State Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW, 689, 691 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010); Bruno 
Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?, 60 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 573, 576 (2011); Moshe Hirsch, Investment Tribunals and Human Rights: 
Divergent Paths, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
ARBITRATION 97, 108 et seq. (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009).  
76  Geneviève Burdeau, Nouvelles perspectives pour l’arbitrage dans le 
contentieux économique intéressant les États, 1995 REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE 3, 15 
(1995) (Fr.); Caroline Henckels, Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate: 
Revisiting Proportionality Analysis and the Standard of Review in Investor–State 
Arbitration, 15 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 223, 241 (2012); Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, 
Enterprise v. State: The New David and Goliath?, 23 ARB. INT’L 93, 104 (2007); 
ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS 7-8 (2009).  
Douglas relies on the European Court of Human Rights on the one hand and the 
jurisprudence of the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal on the other.  The latter is a 
tribunal whose creation was based on a bilateral agreement between both states 
and while its jurisprudence is often cited, one can question whether its existence is 
truly evidence for such an alleged parallel.  See Steven Ratner, Regulatory Takings 
in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of Fragmented International Law, 102 
AM. J. INT’L L. 475, 499 (2008).  For a similar approach, see Jarrod Hepburn, The 
Duty to Give Reasons for Administrative Decisions in International Law, 61 INT’L 
& COMP. L.Q. 641, 655 (2012). 
77  See, e.g., European Convention on Human Rights, art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950.  
78  SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 116 
(Jan. 29, 2004), 8 ICSID Rep. 518 (2005).  See generally Michael Waibel, 
International Investment Law and Treaty Interpretation, in INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW AND GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM CLINICAL ISOLATION TO 
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It is also prudent to be aware of the different goals of human 
rights protection and investment protection.  Although 
asymmetries in the power relations between states and individuals 
exist in both investment law and human rights law,79 and although 
human rights treaties very often include provisions relating to the 
protection of property rights, the procedural and substantive 
provisions in human rights treaties are considerably different from 
those found in investment law treaties. This not only includes the 
different location of human rights law and investment law along 
the public / private divide.80  It also includes the observation that 
unlike the reciprocal obligations a state enters into in investment 
law, the obligations in human rights law “reflect fundamental 
values of the international community.”81 A second observation is 
that granting legal protection to investors finds justification from a 
state’s desire to attract investments by non-state actors.82  
According to Roberts, international investment law is 
undergoing significant change, as the importance of private law 
considerations and investor interests diminishes in favor of greater 
regulatory space for states. 83   Investments from developing 
countries have increased, causing existing developed states to lose 
the immunity from suit they once factually enjoyed.  Capital flows 
                                                             
SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION? 29, 39-40 (Rainer Hofmann & Christian J. Tams eds., 2011).  
On the other hand, see decisions that favor the application of the principle of in 
dubio pro mitius, such as SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic 
Republic of Pak., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Objections to Jurisdiction, 8 ICSID Rep. 451 (2005); The Loewen Group, Inc. and 
Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 
Award, ¶ 160 et seq. (June 26, 2003), 7 ICSID Rep. 442 (2005).  See generally Schill, 
supra note 70, at 314–19. 
79  Hirsch, supra note 75, at 98; Paparinskis, supra note 43, at 80. 
80  Hirsch, supra note 75, at 107. 
81  See id. at 109-10 (explaining that international human rights and 
investment law have different characteristics).  An additional factor to consider is 
that the traditional power relationship between states and investors, in which the 
state assumed the dominant role, may not always be true in certain circumstances, 
which may actualize in the negotiations of concessions and stabilization clauses.  
Paparinskis, supra note 43, at 81.  See also Clara Reiner & Christoph Schreuer, 
Human Rights and International Investment Arbitration, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 82 (Pierre Marie Dupuy, 
Francesco Francioni & Ernst-Ulrich Petersman eds., 2009).   
82  Paparinskis, supra note 43, at 80. 
83  Roberts, supra note 39, at 78. 
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are no longer uni-directional, leaving states that had previously 
considered themselves immune from such suits open to investment 
arbitration.84  Developed states are now being called upon more 
frequently to defend their own policy decisions before arbitral 
tribunals.  Moreover, an increasing number of cases are no longer 
concerned with discrete matters that can be decided without 
exerting considerable influence on public policy in areas such as 
public utilities, the environment, or public health.85  The decreasing 
immunity from suit experienced by developed countries and the 
resulting public policy implications, together with what is 
perceived to be an investor-friendly jurisprudence, have led some 
countries to rethink their commitments to the enterprise of 
international investment arbitration.86  Some states (such as Bolivia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela) have taken the rather aggressive step of 
withdrawing from the ICSID dispute settlement system entirely,87 
while other countries (such as South Africa and Australia) have 
decided to no longer include investor-state arbitration provisions 
                                                             
84  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, South–South 
Cooperation in International Investment Arrangements 6 et seq., 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/3 (2005).  See also José E. Alvarez, The Once and Future 
Foreign Investment Regime, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 607, 634 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al. 
eds., 2011) (“More countries than ever before are . . . capital exporters as well as 
capital importers.”). 
85  UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, IIA ISSUES 
NOTE, NO. 1, 2012: LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 2, 
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2012/10 (Apr. 16, 2012).  
86  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement and Impact on Investment Rulemaking, 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2007/3 (2007), at 92. 
87  ICSID, News Release, Venezuela Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the 
ICSID Convention (Jan. 26, 2012), available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=Announcements
&pageName=Announcement100; ICSID, News Release, Ecuador Submits a Notice 
Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, (July 9, 2009), available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&p
ageName=Announcement20; ICSID, News Release, Bolivia Submits a Notice Under 
Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, (May 16, 2007), available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&p
ageName=Announcement3. 
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in their IIAs.88 
Roberts projects changes to international investment law on the 
basis of these developments in a number of distinct, yet 
interrelated, areas.  She identifies a shift in the interpretative 
balance of power towards states, and away from investment 
tribunals.89   One major reason for this shift is the diminishing 
divide between capital-importing and capital-exporting countries.  
Whereas certain investment treaty provisions had almost 
exclusively benefitted developed countries in the past, they may 
now work to the detriment of these countries.  As a result, Roberts 
expects clarifications and changes to the content of such provisions 
in future IIAs.90   She predicts that the system’s trajectory is one 
that places more “attention on the state as a treaty party and 
regulatory sovereign,” while on the other hand “those that draw 
comparisons with private law or that narrowly focus on the 
importance of investor protections are declining in value.”91  If this 
prediction holds true, it would very much follow in the footsteps of 
international trade law, which also saw a maturing from an initial 
stage in which non-trade law considerations were incorporated 
rather restrictively,92 to one which recognizes these elements and 
substantively no longer treats non-trade concerns in “clinical 
isolation.”93   
International investment dispute adjudication is another area of 
investment law that is undergoing significant change due to the 
diversification of its participants.  What was previously a rather 
                                                             
88  Leon Trakman, Choosing Domestic Courts over Investor-State Arbitration: 
Australia’s Repudiation of the Status Quo, 35 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 979 (2012).  
89  Roberts, supra note 39, at 78.  William W. Park similarly describes the 
whole undertaking of arbitration – commercial and investment arbitration – as 
being in an autumnal stage, positively connoted.  William W. Park, Arbitration in 
Autumn, 2 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 287 (2011). 
90  Roberts, supra note 39, at 78. 
91  Id. 
92  STEFAN ZLEPTNIG, NON-ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES IN WTO LAW: JUSTIFICATION 
PROVISIONS OF GATT, GATS, SPS AND TBT AGREEMENTS 107–09 (2010); Ingo 
Venzke, Making General Exceptions: The Spell of Precedents in Developing Article XX 
GATT into Standards for Domestic Regulatory Policy, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1111, 1116 et 
seq. (2011). 
93  Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline 17, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter US – Gasoline 
Appellate Body Report]. 
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close-knit circle of specialized lawyers with a common background 
in commercial arbitration has diversified to include participants 
from various academic and professional backgrounds. This 
diversified group has also come under public scrutiny to a much 
greater extent than in previous stages.94  Importantly, there is a 
change in the perception of what is being arbitrated. International 
investment dispute adjudication is no longer limited to illegal 
conduct by states in relationships between states and private 
investors. Its scope has broadened to adjudication of public 
interests by investment tribunals. 
 The approaching “adulthood” era of the investment treaty 
system described in Roberts’ view is about to set in, and it abounds 
with uncertainty surrounding its nature.95  Whether the system will 
continue its current trajectory away from a private law paradigm 
to one that is fully public remains to be seen.  The maturing of the 
field may lead to changes on both the procedural and substantive 
levels.  Procedurally, this maturation can bring about a further 
increase in the number of amicus curiae briefs or third-party 
interventions, especially in cases that concern challenges to a 
country’s regulatory fabric that other countries may wish to 
emulate.  Substantively, the system has the potential to mature to a 
stage where disputes are seen as the adjudication of public matters 
rather than discrete, individual controversies. 
 
3.1.2. The WTO Framework 
 
The history of the GATT/WTO framework has had a longer 
period of maturation since its inception in 1947.  In addition, it has 
undergone substantive, procedural, and institutional makeovers 
through the creation of the WTO in 1995.  Negotiations after WWII 
led to the provisional adoption of the GATT, pending the 
anticipated creation of the International Trade Organization 
(ITO).96  The failure of the establishment of the ITO led to the 
GATT being viewed as a quasi-organization, despite Article XXV 
                                                             
94  Roberts, supra note 39, at 83 et seq. 
95  Id. at 90. 
96  JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND 
JURISPRUDENCE 16 (1998). 
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GATT, which did not accord that status to the GATT regime.  
Although the GATT provided a framework for the contracting 
parties to conduct eight subsequent trade rounds and to continue 
working towards greater liberalization of trade, over time the 
existing structure was considered to be insufficient by some parties 
to the GATT.97  This resulted in the negotiation of fundamental 
changes to the existing system during the Uruguay Round, which 
led to the creation of the WTO in 1995.98 
The WTO changed the existing international trading system in 
a number of important ways.  Not only was the subject matter 
which fell under the purview of the WTO enlarged, but because of 
what is known as the “single-undertaking” approach, WTO 
members were no longer able to opt-in to specific agreements 
according to their individual preferences.  With the exception of 
the plurilateral agreements in Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement, 
membership in the WTO requires future members to abide by all 
treaties under the WTO umbrella.  Two of the changes brought 
about by the creation of the WTO are particularly worth analyzing 
in greater detail:  the dispute settlement process and the increased 
recognition of balancing trade liberalization with other important 
societal values and interests. 
The conclusion of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) 
brought about several important changes to the dispute settlement 
mechanism, as it had existed under the GATT.  Article 3.3 DSU 
points to the dual nature of WTO law, stating that “[t]he prompt 
settlement of [disputes] is essential to the effective functioning of 
the WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance between the 
rights and obligations of Members.”99 
The compulsory nature of dispute settlement under Article 23.1 
DSU serves another function – the provision of “security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading system.”100  While dispute 
settlement can take on a variety of forms (including good offices, 
                                                             
97  Id. at 24. 
98  See generally The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-
1992) (Terence Stewart ed., 1993). 
99  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
2: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
art. 3(3), Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 425 [hereinafter DSU]. 
100 Id. art. 3.3.  
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conciliation, mediation,101 and arbitrations102), the default option 
today is adjudication by panels and the AB subsequent to 
mandatory consultations.103 
Once adjudication commences, the dispute comes before a 
panel, and appeals of panel decisions are brought before the AB.  
The panel or AB report is adopted by the DSB quasi-automatically 
through a reverse or “negative” consensus – the report is adopted 
unless a party to the dispute notifies the DSB of its decision to 
appeal (for panel reports), or the DSB decides by consensus not to 
adopt it.104  This is one of the essential differences between the DSU 
dispute settlement mechanism and the previous GATT regime, 
under which an affirmative consensus, including a vote from the 
losing party, was required to adopt a report.105 
Another important change brought about by the emergence of 
the WTO is the very existence of an appellate mechanism, through 
the creation of the AB.  While disputing WTO members can choose 
the members of the panels,106 AB members are appointed by the 
DSB to serve four-year terms, with a possible one-time 
reappointment. 107   Although not envisioned as playing an 
important role at the outset, 108  the AB’s role changed rather 
dramatically from “an afterthought to a centrepiece” of the WTO 
dispute settlement system.109  The AB consists of seven members 
                                                             
101  Id. art. 5.  
102  Id. art. 25. 
103  Id. arts. 4, 6-20.  
104  For examples of reverse or negative consensus provisions relating to the 
adoption of panel reports and AB reports by the DSB, see id. arts. 16(4), 17(14).   
105  HUDEC, supra note 2; Andreas Lowenfeld, Editorial Comment, Remedies 
Along with Rights: Institutional Reform in the New GATT, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 477, 480 
(1994). 
106  See DSU, supra note 99, arts. 8.6, 8.7.  A significant number of panelists are 
now being determined by the WTO Director-General, particularly in situations in 
which the disputing members are unable to agree on the composition of the 
panels.  PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 214 (3d ed. 2013). 
107  DSU, supra note 99, art. 17.2.  
108  See generally Establishment of the Appellate Body, Recommendations by the 
Preparatory Committee for the WTO Approved by the Dispute Settlement Body on 10 
February 1995, ¶¶ 11 et seq., WT/DSB/1 (June 19, 1995). 
109  Peter Van den Bossche, From Afterthought to Centerpiece: The WTO 
Appellate Body and its Rise to Prominence in the World Trading System, in THE WTO 
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and appeals are heard by three-member divisions selected on a 
rotational basis, which takes into account the principles of random 
selection, unpredictability and opportunity for all members to 
serve regardless of their origin.110  The importance of the fixed-
term appointments for AB members should not be underestimated.  
It provides a level of impartiality that allows for the AB to make 
decisions without needing to be concerned about reappointment to 
a subsequent dispute.111  Decisions related to an appeal are made 
exclusively by the three-member division to which it has been 
assigned.  However, to “ensure consistency and coherence in its 
case law and to draw on the individual and collective expertise of 
all seven Members, the division responsible for deciding an appeal 
exchanges views with the other Members on issues raised by the 
appeal” prior to rendering a final decision.112  The purpose of this 
discussion is in line again with the general goal of dispute 
settlement in the WTO:  to achieve “security and predictability in 
the multilateral trading system.”113 
Another change brought about by the existence of the AB is the 
precedential value of AB decisions with respect to subsequent 
panel decisions.  While the decisions of panels and the AB are 
technically binding only on the parties to a dispute, the 
development in the jurisprudence has unofficially established an 
adjudicatory system with precedential value.  In one of its earliest 
decisions, the AB explained that “adopted panel reports are an 
important part of the GATT acquis” and should be taken into 
account when they are relevant to a dispute because they are 
“often considered by subsequent panels” and they “create 
legitimate expectations among WTO members.”114  This position 
was reinforced several years later, with the AB stating that it 
                                                             
AT TEN: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 289 (Giorgio 
Sacerdoti et al. eds., 2006). 
110  Appellate Body Working Paper, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, 
rule 6, WT/AB/WP/6 (Aug. 16, 2010).  
111  The ability of reappointment after four years is somewhat concerning in 
this respect.  An alternative could consist of a one-time appointment with a term 
of six years.  
112  VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 106, at 260. 
113  DSU, supra note 99, art. 3.2. 
114  Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 13,  
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996). 
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“would have expected the Panel” to consider the AB’s reasoning 
from a prior report, because the AB report was intended to 
“provid[e] interpretative guidance for future panels.”115   
The culmination of this development in jurisprudence 
solidifying the precedential value of AB decisions was US – Steel, 
in which the AB laid out its view on the binding nature of AB 
decisions:  “WTO members attach significance to reasoning 
provided in previous panel and Appellate Body reports,” which 
are “often cited by parties in support of legal arguments in dispute 
settlement proceedings” and “relied upon by panels and the 
Appellate Body in subsequent disputes.” 116  It then expressed its 
deep concern “about the Panel’s decision to depart from well-
established Appellate Body jurisprudence clarifying the 
interpretation of the same legal issues” and went on to state that 
“[t]he Panel’s approach has serious implications for the proper 
functioning of the WTO dispute settlement system.”117  Moreover, 
the AB supported this argument by mentioning what appears 
almost obvious:  it would be difficult to realize “the hierarchical 
structure contemplated in the DSU,” which provides for appellate 
review by the AB of panel decisions, without assigning some sort 
of precedential value to AB decisions.118  Indeed, the AB may have 
even issued an implied threat towards the panels when it 
poignantly suggested that the panel’s decision not to follow the AB 
jurisprudence constituted a “[failure] to discharge its duties under 
Article 11 DSU.”119  This form of de facto precedent has paved the 
way for the elucidation of overarching principles in the 
jurisprudence of the AB,120 which is at least by and large now 
                                                             
115  Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, ¶ 107, 
WT/DS8/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001).  See also Appellate Body Report, United States – 
Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from 
Argentina, ¶ 188, WT/DS268/AB/R (Nov. 29, 2004) (stating furthermore that 
“following the Appellate Body’s conclusions in earlier disputes is not only 
appropriate, but is what would be expected from panels, especially where the 
issues are the same”). 
116  Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Stainless Steel from Mexico, ¶ 160, WT/DS344/AB/R (Apr. 30, 2008). 
117  Id. ¶ 162. 
118  Id. ¶ 161. 
119  Id. ¶ 162. 
120  David Palmeter & Petros Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Sources of 
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followed by the panels.121  
A second change concerning dispute settlement from the era of 
the GATT to the current system under the WTO lies in the different 
normative environment between the two eras. 122   Dispute 
settlement under the GATT was consistently regarded as a more 
formal exercise in diplomacy123 and procedures were only changed 
towards a more formalized legal order in the 1980s with the 
creation of the legal division in the GATT secretariat. Nevertheless, 
the traditional paradigm under the GATT prior to 1995 remained 
“embedded liberalism,” a term coined by John Ruggie denoting 
that despite the existence of the interventionist welfare state, trade 
liberalization was a firmly entrenched paradigm.124  This meant 
that the ethos of trade experts of the first hour remained the 
orthodox view in the context of the GATT as an organization, 
including its dispute settlement process. 
For present purposes, it is important to bear in mind that the 
GATT from the beginning contained justifications for breaches of 
other GATT provisions, including justifications under the heading 
of general exceptions in Article XX GATT or on the basis of 
economic emergencies,125 security concerns,126 regional integration 
mechanisms,127 balance of payment concerns,128 or for reasons of 
economic development.129  These rules were supplemented by a 
                                                             
Law, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 398, 401 (1998).  
121  See generally Wagner, supra note 67 (commenting on the debate between 
the panels and the AB concerning the SPS Agreement).  
122  For the approach taken under the SPS Agreement and the TBT 
Agreement, see infra Section II, 2, b.  
123  HUDEC, supra note 2 (arguing that the GATT was best characterized as a 
“diplomat’s concept of legal order.  At least, that is the way it started out”).  
124 John G. Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded 
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT’L ORG. 379 (1982). 
125  GATT, supra note 1, art. XIX GATT.  
126  GATT, supra note 1, art. XXI GATT. 
127  GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIV GATT.  
128  GATT, supra note 1, art. XII;art. XVIII, Sec. B GATT.   
129  Committee on Trade and Development, Note by Secretariat: Implementation 
of Special and Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions, ¶ 3, 
Oct. 25, 2000, WT/COMTD/W/77; Note by the Secretariat—Addendum: Information 
on the Utilisation of Special and Differential Treatment Provisions, Feb. 7, 2002, 
WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.4. 
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system of waivers.130  The justifications under Article XX GATT 
serve as an exemption, within limitations, from GATT rules and 
concessions concerning the goals otherwise pursued by the GATT, 
most prominently the liberalization of trade.  
The difference in how Article XX GATT was interpreted prior 
to the emergence of the WTO can be attributed not only to a less 
politicized process by way of introducing a permanent appellate 
mechanism, but also a different conception of the competing 
interests.  Under the GATT regime, Article XX GATT was 
interpreted in a very narrow fashion, creating a standard for 
justification that was almost impossible to meet,131  including in 
cases concerning the environment.132   
Under the WTO, the AB interpreted the same provisions 
differently. The same cannot be said for the panel level, which had 
continued the jurisprudence that had previously existed under the 
GATT regime.133   The AB took issue with the interpretation of 
Article XX(g) GATT, especially with respect to the term “related 
to” and adopted a more lenient standard.  Prior to the Gasoline 
decision, disagreement arose over the order in which this provision 
is to be analyzed.  The AB made it clear that the analysis is to be 
conducted in two steps:  in a first step, panels and the AB examine 
a WTO member’s measure under one of the paragraphs (a) – (j), 
followed by an analysis of whether the measure’s application is in 
                                                             
130  ISABEL FEICHTNER, THE LAW AND POLITICS OF WTO WAIVERS: STABILITY AND 
FLEXIBILITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Lorand Bartels et al. eds., 2014). 
131  Venzke, supra note 92, at 1117. 
       132  Panel Report, United States—Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna 
Products from Canada, L/5198-29S/91 (Feb. 22, 1982); Panel Report, Canada—
Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, L/6268-35S/98 (Mar. 
22, 1998) (finding that the export prohibitions were not justified by Article XX 
GATT because they “could not be deemed to be primarily aimed at the 
conservation of salmon and herring stocks and rendering effective the restrictions 
on the harvesting of these fish”); Panel Report, Thailand—Restrictions on 
Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, DS10/R-37S/200 (Nov. 7, 1990) 
(considering Article XX(b) GATT measures “necessary for the protection of 
human, animal plant life or health” as the subject of interpretation).  These 
decisions emphasized the maintenance of a regime of trade liberalization at the 
almost total expense of other public policy goals such as those enshrined in Article 
XX GATT.  
133  See, e.g., Panel Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996).  
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accordance with the chapeau of Article XX GATT.134  Importantly, 
this clarified the structure of the provision in that the chapeau 
exists in order to curb abuse by a WTO member invoking one of 
the justifications in Article XX GATT.  Understood in this sense, the 
statement by the AB that the “General Agreement is not to be read in 
clinical isolation from public international law” makes clear that 
WTO law is embedded in a wider system of public international 
law.135  A similar chain of events was evident in the US – Shrimp 
case, in which the panel similarly exhibited an approach that – 
while paying lip service to the “legitimacy of environmental 
policies” – saw such policies as “unilateral measures which, by 
their nature, could put the multilateral trading system at risk.”136 
The AB, similar to its previous decision in US – Gasoline, made 
clear what it saw as the purpose of Article XX GATT:  allowing for 
a justification of measures that may otherwise contravene 
provisions such as Articles I, III or XI GATT, while making sure 
that such measures are not taken as an “abuse or misuse of a given 
kind of exception.”137 
The subsequent jurisprudence has followed this line of 
thought.138  There is disagreement over the extent to which the AB 
                                                             
134  See generally US — Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 93; 
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12 2001) [hereinafter EC – 
Asbestos Appellate Body Report]; Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures 
Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 139, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007) 
[hereinafter Brazil – Retreaded Tyres Appellate Body Report].  
135 US — Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 93.  
136 Panel Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, ¶ 7.60, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter US – Shrimp Panel 
Report]. 
137  Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, ¶ 116 (Dec. 12, 1998) [hereinafter US – Shrimp Appellate Body 
Report] (finding that “[i]t is not necessary to assume that requiring from exporting 
countries compliance with, or adoption of, certain policies (although covered in 
principle by one or another of the exceptions) prescribed by the importing 
country, renders a measure a priori incapable of justification under Article XX.  
Such an interpretation renders most, if not all, of the specific exceptions of Article 
XX inutile, a result abhorrent to the principles of interpretation we are bound to 
apply.”).  See ibid., ¶ 121.  
138  See, e.g., EC – Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 134; Brazil – 
Retreaded Tyres Appellate Body Report, supra note 134; Appellate Body Report, 
Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, 
WT/DS161/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Korea – Various Measures on Beef 
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has developed this line of reasoning into a full-fledged 
proportionality jurisprudence.139  Be that as it may, it is hard to 
contest that the jurisprudence of the AB, which has clearly 
expanded the argumentative space for invoking the justifications in 
Article XX GATT compared to the approach championed by panels 
in the GATT era, would not have developed without either the 
institutional change brought about by the adoption of the DSU or 
the realization that in an increasingly interdependent world, WTO 
members making domestic decisions over matters such as the 
protection of health or the environment deserve a certain amount 
of regulatory space.  Such decisions are not permitted to be made 
without limitations, however.  This increasingly legalized form of 
deciding complex interactions has moved away from the 
diplomatic-political origin of the GATT era,140 although remnants 
of that system remain. 
 
3.2. Trade Regulation and Regulatory Expropriations:  Trade and 
Investment Law 
 
Before comparing and contrasting the two fields of 
international trade and investment law, it is worth pointing out 
that the two fields have, at first sight, distinctly different goals:  
international investment law has developed as a protective 
mechanism concerning the investments that individuals or 
corporations make in a different jurisdiction.  International trade 
law, on the other hand, has developed by reducing tariffs and 
other barriers to trade by curbing protectionism.   
A comparison between terms in particular provisions of both 
regimes meets considerable challenges, as such terms are 
dependent on the overall purpose of the treaty in which they are 
found as well as the context of the provision in which they appear.  
The concept of regulatory space can be approached from two 
                                                             
Appellate Body Report]. 
139  Venzke, supra note 92, at 1130. 
140  J.H.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on 
the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 
191 (2001); Adrian T. Chua, Precedent and Principles of WTO Panel Jurisprudence, 16 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L.  171, 173 (1998).  
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different directions. In the case of international investment law, 
regulatory space functions as a justification for an intrusion on 
investment guarantees, especially in cases where an investment 
may conflict with what the host state considers a desirable public 
policy.  In the case of international trade law, the justification is 
similarly based upon a public policy decision against a 
commitment towards other WTO members to reduce barriers to 
trade and avoid protectionism. 
This section uses the field of regulatory expropriations to 
examine the amount of regulatory space countries possess in 
international investment law.  It then analyzes the regulatory space 
WTO members have under two agreements under the WTO 
umbrella:  the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(“SPS Agreement”)141 and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (“TBT Agreement”).142  
 
3.2.1. Investment Law:  Regulatory Expropriations 
 
International investment law pursues a number of goals, 
including the protection of investors and investments as well as the 
promotion of general welfare through foreign direct investment.143  
Investors demand protection: for example, investments in 
infrastructure projects are generally high-risk undertakings and 
require the infusion of often considerable capital over a long period 
of time and are subject to changing political realities within the 
host state. Because of these characteristics, investors expect 
                                                             
141  Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 
Jan. 1, 1995, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS Agreement], available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.pdf. 
142  Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Jan. 1, 1995, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 
[hereinafter TBT Agreement], available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf. 
143  Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of Phil., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/06, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 116 (Jan. 29, 2004) and Société Générale 
de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pak., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, 
Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 171 (Aug. 6, 2003).  Saluka Investments BV v. Czech 
Republic, UNCITRAL, ¶ 300 (Mar. 17, 2006).  But see Jason Webb Yackee, Do 
Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from 
Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397 (2011) (suggesting that bilateral 
investment treaties are “unlikely to significantly drive foreign investment”). 
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stability with respect to administrative decision-making. 144  
Traditional international investment law has placed considerable 
emphasis on the protection of these investments, although, as laid 
out above, the field is undergoing change at the moment. 
 
3.2.1.1. The Changing Landscape of Investment 
Regulation 
 
As a counterpoint to the protection of investors, more recent 
IIAs have incorporated provisions that explicitly recognize the 
importance of non-economic factors, such as human, animal plant 
life or health or the environment.145  This hints at the recognition of 
the need to find a balance between the individual rights of 
investors on the one hand and the regulatory needs of societies on 
the other.146   
The move began initially with the inclusion of provisions in the 
preamble to investment agreements, such as those of the Energy 
Charter Treaty or the NAFTA. The former recalls “the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution and its 
protocols, and other international environmental agreements with 
energy-related aspects.”  It recognizes “the increasingly urgent 
need for measures to protect the environment, including the 
decommissioning of energy installations and waste disposal, and 
for internationally-agreed objectives and criteria for these 
                                                             
144  Rudolf Dolzer, Indirect Expropriation: New Developments?, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL 
L.J.  64, 80 (2002); Ralf Buckley, International Trade, Investment and Environmental 
Regulation: An Environmental Management Perspective, 27 J.  WORLD TRADE 101, 117–
18 (1993). 
145  See generally NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 49, at 504; Thomas 
Waelde & Abba Kolo, Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and 
‘Regulatory Taking’ in International Law, 50 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.  811, 816–17 (2001); 
ANDREAS KULICK, GLOBAL PUBLIC INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 69 
(James Crawford et al. eds., 2012); Suzanne A. Spears, The Quest for Policy Space in 
a New Generation of International Investment Agreements, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1037 
(2010).  
146  Christoph Schreuer, The Concept of Expropriation Under the ETC and Other 
Investment Protection Treaties, 5 TRANSNAT’L DISPUTE MGMT. (2005), available at 
http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/csunpublpaper_3.pdf. 
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purposes.” 147   The latter contains the following language:  the 
parties “UNDERTAKE each of the preceding [investment and 
trade objectives] in a manner consistent with environmental 
protection and conservation; PRESERVE their flexibility to 
safeguard the public welfare; PROMOTE sustainable development; 
STRENGTHEN the development and enforcement of 
environmental laws and regulations.”148 
Similarly, the 2012 US Model BIT declares in its preamble that 
the other objectives of the BIT are to be achieved “in a manner 
consistent with the protection of health, safety and the 
environment.”149  In its operative part, Article 12 of the 2012 US 
Model BIT, dealing with the environment, is consistent with the 
2004 US Model BIT in that recognizes the inappropriateness of 
encouraging investment in those instances when it weakens or 
reduces environmental protections. 150   It furthermore replicates 
language from the 2004 version when it states:  
 
Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed to prevent a Party 
from adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any measure 
otherwise consistent with this Treaty that it considers 
appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its 
territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to 
environmental concerns.151 
 
The added language in the 2012 U.S. Model BIT imposes an 
affirmative obligation on the parties to ensure that the parties do 
not waive or derogate from domestic environmental laws or labor 
laws and mandates that the parties “effectively enforce” these 
rules.152  A new clause was added that provides the parties with 
                                                             
147  The Energy Charter Treaty, Annex 1 to the Final Act of the European 
Energy Charter Conference, pmbl., 40 (Dec. 1994).  
148  North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex. (Jan. 1, 1994).  
149  2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, Treaty Between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government of ___ 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, art. 
12(2), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf. 
150  Id.  
151  Id.  
152  Id. 
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more regulatory space (the 2012 U.S. Model BIT uses the term 
“discretion”) “with respect to regulatory, compliance, 
investigatory, and prosecutorial matters, and to make decisions 
regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement with respect 
to other environmental matters determined to have higher 
priorities.”153  This expanded regulatory space is conditioned on 
the discretion being exercised in a reasonable manner.  
Compared with the 2012 US Model BIT, the 2004 Canadian 
Model BIT is more explicit. Article 10 is structurally analogous to 
Article XX GATT and Article XIV of the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (“GATS”).  The provision states: 
 
 1. Subject to the requirement that such measures are not 
applied in a manner that would constitute arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between investments or 
between investors, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade or investment, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party from 
adopting or enforcing measures necessary: 
           
  (a) to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
 (b) to ensure compliance with laws and regulations that are  
 not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement; or 
  (c) for the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible  
  natural resources.154   
 
Other agreements incorporate the relevant GATT and GATS 
rules by way of reference.  
In this context, it is important to draw a distinction not only 
between direct expropriations and indirect expropriations,155 but 
                                                             
153  Id. art. 12(3). 
154  2004 Canada Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, Agreement Between 
Canada and ___ for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, art. 10, available 
at http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf.  
155  The majority of today’s disputes no longer concern direct expropriations, 
but rather indirect expropriations.  See generally W. Michael Reisman & Robert D. 
Sloane, Indirect Expropriation and Its Valuation in the BIT Generation, BRIT. Y.B. INT’L 
L. 115, 118 (2003).  See Dolzer, supra note 144, at 66 (stating that “it is not 
unreasonable to assume that the legal issues in the foreign investment context 
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also to distinguish compensable expropriations and non-
compensable regulation.  Non-compensable regulations are often 
described as “regulatory takings” or “regulatory deprivations” and 
are state actions that are not singular, but rather exemplify 
abstract-general rules that are on their face non-discriminatory.156  
The present analysis is only concerned with regulatory takings, 
which is governmental rule-making that is not normally directed at 
an individual investor, but rather is directed at investors that 
formulate abstract-general rules applicable to a variety of 
circumstances.  One recent example of such a governmental rule is 
the ban on printing logos onto cigarette packages in order to better 
protect public health.157 
It is this latter distinction that is important for the purposes of 
this comparison.  By 1980, the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States already provided guidelines with 
respect to expropriations in general, developing the concepts of 
unreasonable interference, undue delay, and the effective 
enjoyment of property as criteria.  Section 712 of the Restatement 
provides that: 
 
 A state is responsible under international law for injury 
resulting from:  (1) a taking by the state of the property of a 
national of another state that (a) is not for a public purpose, 
or (b) is discriminatory, or (c) is not accompanied by 
provision for just compensation . . . .158 
                                                             
may, for the time being, be dominated by the definition of expropriation”);  see 
generally Schreuer, supra note 146, at 5-45. 
156  Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Eng’rs of 
Iran, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 219, 225 (1984).  See generally Ratner, supra note 76, 
at 478; L. Yves Fortier & Stephen L. Drymer, Indirect Expropriation in the Law of 
International Investment: I Know It When I See It, or Caveat Investor, 19 ICSID REV.—
FOREIGN INV. L.J. 293, 294 (2004).  
157  See generally Jennifer M. Freedman, Australia Said to Face WTO Complaint 
over Tobacco Packaging, Ban on Logos, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 5, 2012, 3:03 AM), available 
at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-05/australia-said-to-face-wto-
complaint-over-ban-on-tobacco-logos.html. 
158  See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 
712(1) (1986) (clarifying that this section applies to direct as well as indirect 
expropriations). 
Subsection (1) applies . . . to other actions of the government that have 
the effect of “taking” the property, in whole or in large part, outright or 
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At the same time, the Restatement also made clear that: 
 
 A state is not responsible for loss of property or for other 
economic disadvantage resulting from bona fide general 
taxation, regulation, forfeiture for crime, or other action of 
the kind that is commonly accepted as within the police 
power of states, if it is not discriminatory, . . . and is not 
designed to cause the alien to abandon the property to the 
state or sell it at a distress price.159 
 
Article 1110 of NAFTA has served as a blueprint for a number 
of other agreements, spelling out the requirements as follows: 
 
1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or 
expropriate an investment of an investor of another Party in 
its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization 
or expropriation of such an investment (“expropriation”), 
except: 
 
(a) for a public purpose; 
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis; 
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 
1105(1); and 
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with 
[provisions pertaining to valuation and payment 
procedures].160 
                                                             
in stages (“creeping expropriation”).  A state is responsible as for an 
expropriation of property under Subsection (1) when it subjects alien 
property to taxation, regulation, or other action that is confiscatory, or 
that prevents, unreasonably interferes with, or unduly delays, effective 
enjoyment of an alien’s property or its removal from the state’s territory.  
Id. § 712 Comment (g).  
159  Id. § 712 Comment (g). 
160  North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 1110, Dec. 17, 1992, T.I.A.S. 
No. 03,725.  In its attempt to create a convention on expropriations, the OECD 
suggested language similar to the NAFTA text:  
  A Contracting Party shall not expropriate or nationalize directly or 
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The failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)161 used 
similar language to NAFTA, but, importantly, used language that 
attempted to clarify the difference between the right to regulate 
and the need to compensate.  A provision in the Annex spelled out 
that: “[a] Contracting Party may adopt, maintain or enforce any 
measure that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment 
activity is undertaken in a manner sensitive to health, safety or 
environmental concerns, provided such measures are consistent 
with this agreement.”162   
Moreover, the interpretative note to Article 5 concerning 
expropriations and compensation spelled out that: 
 
 The reference in Article IV.2.1 to expropriation or 
nationalisation and ‘measures tantamount to expropriation 
or nationalisation’ reflects the fact that international law 
requires compensation for an expropriatory taking without 
regard to the label applied to it, even if title to the property 
is not taken.  It does not establish a new requirement that 
Parties pay compensation for losses which an investor or 
                                                             
indirectly an investment in its territory of an investor of another 
Contracting Party or take any measure or measures having equivalent 
effect (hereinafter referred to as “expropriation”) except: 
  a) for a purpose which is in the public interest, 
  b) on a non-discriminatory basis, 
  c) in accordance with due process of law, and 
  d) accompanied by payment of prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation . . . . 
Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, Org. for Econ. 
Cooperation & Dev., Oct. 12, 1967, 7 I.L.M. 117, 126. 
161  See generally Jürgen Kurtz, A General Investment Agreement in the WTO? 
Lessons from Chapter 11 of NAFTA and the OECD Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 713, 756-73 (2002). 
162  Negotiating Group on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) 
at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Chairman’s Note 
on the Environment and Related Matters and on Labour, Mar. 9, 1998, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng9810e.pdf.  The MAI was negotiated 
between 1995 and 1998, but never attained the necessary support by countries to 
come into existence.  See generally Mary E. Footer, On the Laws for Attraction: 
Examining the Relationship Between Foreign Investment and International Trade, in 
PROSPECTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 105, 112–13 (Roberto 
Echandi & Pierre Sauvé eds., 2013). 
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investment may incur through regulation, revenue raising 
and other normal activity in the public interest undertaken 
by governments.163 
 
The change in treaty language is a good indicator that a 
growing amount of weight is being given to non-economic values.  
Accordingly, it has become increasingly apparent that international 
investment law has turned away from seeing investment 
promotion and protection as its sole purpose, at the expense of 
other key values. 
Over the course of the last fifteen to twenty years, a number of 
additional criteria have been developed in the case law that shed 
light on this distinction.164  However, the case law has failed to 
establish bright-line rules or, in the words of the tribunal in 
Generation Ukraine, to establish a “checklist” or a “mechanical 
                                                             
163 Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to Regulate” in International Investment 
Law 9 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Working Papers on Int’l Inv. No. 
2004/4, 2004), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/33776546
.pdf.  
164  Other approaches exist, namely the “sole effects” doctrine applied in the 
jurisprudence of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, NAFTA decisions, and a small 
number of ICSID cases.  In the case of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, however, it is 
important to bear in mind the particular circumstances of its creation and the 
cases it dealt with, which were characterized mainly by claims related to the 
seizing of physical property by the new government or individuals and groups 
closely associated with the new government, or related to deprivation through the 
appointment of new managers.  Ralph F. Fuchs, Development and Diversification in 
Administrative Rule Making, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 83 (1977).  See, e.g., Tippetts, Abbett, 
McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Eng’rs of Iran, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 
Rep. 219, 226 (1984); Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶ 103 (Aug. 30, 2000); Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa 
Elena, S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Final Award, ¶¶ 
71-72 (Feb. 17, 2000).  See generally Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Property By the 
State: Recent Developments in International Law, 176 RECUEIL DES COURS 259, 331 
(1982).  But see Schreuer, supra note 147, at 119 (citing the Convention Establishing 
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency of 1985, which defines 
expropriation as “any legislative action or administrative action or omission 
attributable to the host government which has the effect of depriving the holder of 
a guarantee of his ownership or control of, or a substantial benefit from, his 
investment”); and Dolzer, supra note 144, at 91 (stating that “[i]t is also beyond 
doubt, however, that the more recent jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals reveals a 
remarkable tendency to shift the focus of the analysis away from the context and 
the purpose and focus more heavily on the effects on the owner.”). 
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test.” 165   The criteria includes:  (1) whether the measure is 
discriminatory, (2) the extent to which governments interfere with 
property rights, (3) the purpose of the measure, (4) whether the 
measure is proportional regarding the impact on the investor and 
the public policy that is being pursued, and (5) to what extent the 
measure is contrary to legitimate investor expectations.166  Echoing 
this development, Philippe Sands states that “those charged with 
interpreting and applying treaties on the protection of foreign 
investment need to take into account the values that are reflected 
in norms that have arisen outside the context of the investment 
treaty which they are applying.”167 
 
3.2.1.1.1. Non-Discrimination 
 
A measure will not pass muster if it is de jure or de facto 
discriminatory.  As is true in other areas of international economic 
law, discriminatory treatment in international investment law is a 
cause for host state liability, unless justified in narrow 
circumstances.  The rationale is simple:  without a level playing 
field between domestic and foreign operators, foreign competitors 
are likely to be at a disadvantage due to the lack of political 
connectedness and inability to exert as much political pressure as 
their domestic counterparts. 
                                                             
165  Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, Final 
Award, ¶ 20.29 (Sept. 16, 2003).  See generally Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech 
Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 265 (Mar. 17, 2006).  
166  See generally, Katia Yannaca-Small, Indirect Expropriation and the Right to 
Regulate: How to Draw the Line?, in ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE TO THE KEY ISSUES 445, 462 (Katia Yannaca-
Small ed., 2010); Higgins, supra note 165, at 322-54; Rahim Moloo & Justin Jacinto, 
Environmental and Health Regulation: Assessing Liability Under Investment Treaties, 29 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 11–25 (2011) (discussing the standard used in finding 
indirect expropriation, which focuses on the purpose of the regulatory measure); 
Ratner, supra note 76, at 482-83 (providing a break down of several factors used to 
assess government interference); Waelde & Kolo, supra note 145, at 827 (listing 
criteria numbers (1), (3) and (4), but acknowleding that they are not the end of 
analysis, as the balancing of several relevant criteria is necessary); and Burns H. 
Weston, “Constructive Takings” Under International Law: A Modest Foray into the 
Problem of “Creeping Expropriation,” 16 VA. J. INT’L L. 103 (1975). 
167  Philippe Sands, Searching for Balance: Concluding Remarks, 11 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 198, 202 (2002). 
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One of the paradigmatic cases in this regard is Ethyl Corp. v. 
Canada.168  Concerned about the health and environmental effects 
of a fuel additive called methylcyclopentadienyl manganese 
tricarbonyl (“MMT”), the Canadian government attempted to ban 
its importation, but did not provide evidence of a harmful health 
effect from the use of MMT.169  Moreover, Canada prohibited only 
the importation of MMT, not the production of MMT by its 
domestic producers, thus hinting at some form of protectionist 
agenda.170 
A similar motivation appears to have been behind a later 
decision by the Canadian government to ban the export of poly-
chlorinated biphenyl (PCB) waste, which led to a complaint by a 
U.S. company.  The arbitral decision pointed out that the record 
clearly indicated that the measure was put in place not on the basis 
of health or environmental concerns, but rather as a protectionist 
measure benefitting the domestic PCB waste industry. 171   The 
tribunal found that the Canadian policy was primarily aimed at the 
protection of the Canadian PCB disposal industry from foreign, 
especially U.S., competition. 172   Such motivations, if sufficient 
evidence can be found, can in most cases lead to a finding of a 
measure’s illegality without the need for further evidence. 
 
3.2.1.1.2. Extent of Interference with Property 
Rights 
 
Often described as the most contentious, this element concerns 
the extent to which a governmental measure must impact investor 
rights to constitute an expropriation. 173   Not every miniscule 
interference is reason for bringing an investment claim; rather, an 
                                                             
168  Ethyl Corp. v. Gov’t of Canada, Decision on Jurisdiction, NAFTA-
UNCITRAL, (June 24, 1998).  See generally Alan C. Swan, Ethyl Corporation v. 
Canada, Award on Jurisdiction (Under NAFTA/UNCITRAL), 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 159 
(2000). 
169  Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 166, at 29.  
170  Waelde & Kolo, supra note 145, at 834. 
171  S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Gov’t of Canada, Partial Award (NAFTA-UNCITRAL), 
¶ 193 (Nov. 13, 2000). 
172  Id. ¶ 194. 
173  Waelde & Kolo, supra note 145, at 837. 
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investor must absorb such interference as a regular commercial 
risk.174  Yet, overbearing regulations may render property useless 
without appropriate compensation. 175  It is therefore necessary to 
find the proper balance between these two poles.176  Unlike direct 
expropriations, where property is taken away by governmental 
measures, this type of situation is characterized by significantly 
reducing the commercial value of the property for the investors.177  
At one extreme, which the Tecmed tribunal pointed out, are 
situations in which the deprivation is total and extends over time.  
In such situations regulatory measures could be an “indirect de 
facto expropriation if they are irreversible and permanent and if the 
assets or rights subject to such measure[s] have been affected in 
such a way that . . . any form or exploitation thereof . . . has 
disappeared.”178 
Other situations are not as clear-cut.  Oftentimes, profit is not 
completely withheld, but is reduced, as was the case in Pope & 
Talbot v. Canada.  Since the company’s sales were not entirely 
prevented, the tribunal found that the interference was not 
“sufficiently restrictive to support a conclusion that the property 
has been taken away from the owner.”179  A similar situation that 
was truly regulatory in nature was at issue in S.D. Myers v. Canada, 
concerning a ban on PCB waste export to the U.S. The tribunal 
concluded that regulations constitute lesser interference than 
expropriation.180  These tribunal decisions, together with others,181 
                                                             
174  Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/8, Award, ¶¶ 335-36 (Sept. 11, 2007); and Starrett Housing Corp. v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 112, 156 (Aug. 14, 1987). 
175  Rudolf Dolzer & Margrete Stevens, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 25-26 
(1995); Thomas C. Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 30 
(1986-1987); Waelde & Kolo, supra note 145, at 835. 
176  Ratner, supra note 76, at 498; Waelde & Kolo, supra note 145, at 840. 
177  But see Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶ 112 (Aug. 30, 2000) (deciding that the government’s 
adoption of the Ecological Decree amounts to indirect expropriation); see also 
Waelde & Kolo, supra note 145, at 838. 
178  Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 116 (May 29, 2003). 
179  Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Gov’t of Canada, UNCITRAL-NAFTA, Damages, ¶ 
99 (May 31, 2002).  
180  S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Gov’t of Canada, NAFTA-UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 
¶¶ 281-82 (Nov. 13, 2000).  
181  Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, Award, 
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point to a shift away from the earlier examination of the impact on 
the investor as the sole criterion for determining whether a 
governmental measure is expropriatory or regulatory.182  
            
3.2.1.1.3. Purpose of Governmental Measure 
 
Notwithstanding some contrary decisions,183 there appears to 
have been a slow, albeit steady, recognition that the purpose of the 
measure plays a role in the evaluation of a comprehensive 
measure.184   The tribunal in S.D. Myers referenced this type of 
thinking when it found that a tribunal “must look at the real 
interests involved and the purpose and the effect of the 
governmental measure.” 185   These interests may be subject to 
change over time through the coming into power of a new 
government with different priorities, through new scientific 
insights requiring new regulatory measures to combat risks that 
were previously unknown (for instance, climate change), 186  or 
through societal changes that favor protection of the environment 
                                                             
¶ 20.32 (Sept. 16, 2003); Glamis Gold, Ltd. v U.S., ICSID Case, Award, ¶ 536 (June 
8, 2009); Marvin Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, ¶ 
142 (Dec. 16, 2002); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 263 (May 12, 2005). 
182  But see generally Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶ 111 (Aug. 30, 2000). 
183  See supra note 164.  
184  See Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, ICSID, Award, ¶ 356 (June 8, 2009) 
(finding that, after evaluating the treatment of the claimant through a 
comprehensive analysis, the international minimum standard of treatment was 
not breached); G.C. Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of Property Under 
International Law?, 38 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 307, (1962) (stating that “the existence of 
generally recognized considerations of public health, safety, morals or welfare 
will normally lead to a conclusion that there has been no ‘taking.’”).  See also 
SORNARAJAH, supra note 63, at 374 (explaining that “non-discriminatory measures 
relating to anti-trust, consumer protection, securities, environmental protection, 
land planning are non-compensable takings since they are regarded as essential to 
the functioning of the state.”); Fortier & Drymer, supra note 156, at 326 (describing 
the international law of indirect exproriation as “very sketchy and rough”). 
185  S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Gov’t of Canada, NAFTA, Partial Award, 40 I.L.M. 
1408, ¶ 285 (Nov. 12, 2000). 
186  Markus Wagner, Taking Interdependence Seriously: The Need for a 
Reassessment of the Precautionary Principle in International Trade Law, 20 CARDOZO J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 713 (2012). 
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over other considerations. 
A number of investment tribunal decisions have recognized 
that the purpose of a governmental measure is an element in 
reaching the decision of whether compensation is mandatory or 
not.  The Feldman tribunal’s decision may contain the most specific 
rationale to date, explaining that “governments must be free to act 
in the broader public interest through protection of the 
environment, new or modified tax regimes, the granting or 
withdrawal of government subsidies, reductions or increases in 
tariff levels, imposition of zoning restrictions, and the like.”187  This 
decision was clearly informed by the idea that not every 
governmental regulation, so long as it is reasonable, is 
compensable.  A measure’s purpose is often, though not always, 
closely tied to the requirement that a measure be non-
discriminatory.  There have been cases in which the purpose of the 
measure may be laudable or genuinely based on the protection of 
important societal values, yet such a measure fails because of a 
protectionist purpose.188  In many ways, this is reminiscent of the 
situation in the WTO. 
 
3.2.1.1.4. Proportionality 
 
International investment law had for the longest time 
functioned without making explicit reference to the principle of 
proportionality.  This changed when the principle, guided 
substantially by the European Court of Human Rights’ 
jurisprudence in James v. United Kingdom,189 was introduced into 
investment law by the decisions in S.D. Myers190 and Feldman191 and 
                                                             
187  Marvin Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, ¶ 
103 (Dec. 16, 2002). 
188  S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Gov’t of Canada, NAFTA, Partial Award, 40 I.L.M. 
1408, ¶¶ 252-57 (Nov. 13, 2000). 
189  James v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4 (1986).  See also 
Stephan Schill, Cross-Regime Harmonization Through Proportionality Analysis: The 
Case of International Investment Law, the Law of State Immunity and Human Rights, 27 
ICSID REV. 87, 107 (2012). 
190  S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, NAFTA, 40 I.L.M 1408, ¶¶ 252–57 (Nov. 13, 
2000). 
191  Marvin Feldman v. Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1 (Dec. 
16, 2002). 
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reiterated later in the Tecmed case.192  This principle or analytical 
structure spells out that state action must not only serve a 
legitimate goal, but must also be suitable (i.e., the purported goal 
must be furthered by the measure), necessary (i.e., that no less 
intrusive measure exists which achieves the same objective) and, 
finally, proportional in a strict sense (i.e., the measure must 
appropriately balance the competing interests of public policy and 
private rights).193  It is important to recognize that the principle of 
proportionality serves in the large majority of cases as a control 
against governmental overreach or, at the very least, forces 
governments to be more precise in their own assessments and 
reasoning, lest they be subject to judicial review.194  It thus reflects 
an approach that recognizes that rights are rarely absolute and 
allows for a “more or less,” rather than an “all or nothing” 
approach.195 
The Tecmed decision has laid down a considerable amount of 
this analytical structure.196  The case concerned a claim made by an 
investor that the Mexican government failed to renew a temporary 
operating license for a landfill for hazardous waste and, therefore, 
breached its obligations contained in a BIT.  The government’s 
argument for refusing to renew the license consisted of lack of 
reliability and operated against certain regulatory requirements.  
                                                             
192  Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. Mexico, Award, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/00/2 (May 29, 2003). 
193  See generally Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing 
and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 75-6 (2008);  Benedict 
Kingsbury & Stephan Schill, Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and 
Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law, in 50 
Years of the New York Convention: ICCA International Arbitration Conference 
(Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2009), available at 
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/146.  See generally Robert Alexy, THEORIE DER 
GRUNDRECHTE (1985); Aharon Barak, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
AND THEIR LIMITATIONS (2012). 
194  Henckels, supra note 76, at 229; Kingsbury & Schill, supra note 193; Erlend 
M. Leonhardsen, Looking for Legitimacy: Exploring Proportionality Analysis in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 3 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 95, 115-16 (2012).  But see 
generally Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International 
Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 715, 761 (2008). 
195  RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 21 (1977). 
196  See Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 121 (May 29, 2003) (recognizing that 
even non-discriminatory regulations enacted for a legitimate public purpose may 
entail compensatory responsibility). 
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However, the refusal to grant the license only came about after 
considerable protest by the local population, which prompted the 
company to relocate to a different site.  In the meantime, the 
investor wanted to maintain the landfill for five months until the 
new facility had been created.197  Today, it remains one of the only 
decisions that attempts to distinguish an appropriate use of 
governmental regulatory power from compensable expropriation.  
It inquired into “whether such actions or measures are 
proportional to the public interest presumably protected thereby 
and to the protection legally granted to investments, taking into 
account that the significance of such impact has a key role upon 
deciding the proportionality.” 198   Moreover, the tribunal 
recognized that “[t]here must be a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the charge or weight imposed to the 
foreign investor and the aim sought to be realized by any 
expropriatory measure.”199   
The S.D. Myers decision is important not only for recognizing 
that there is a duty to enact measures that are least restrictive, but 
also for referencing WTO law in this regard.200  Similar approaches 
have been taken by other arbitral tribunals, although sometimes 
without explicitly referencing the principle of proportionality or 
without making its underlying assumptions explicit.201  In LG&E, 
the tribunal stated that it was required to balance the “degree of 
the measure’s interference with the right of ownership” against 
“the power of the State to adopt its policies,” while being mindful 
of the “context within which a measure was adopted and the host 
                                                             
197  Id. ¶ 99.  The tribunal in the end decided that the decisive criterion for the 
refusal to grant the license lay not in the alleged violations of permits, but rather 
in political considerations.  See Henckels, supra note 76, at 232-33. 
198  Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2, ¶ 122 (May 29, 2003).  See Henckels, supra note 76, at 232-33; 
Stephan Schill, ‘Revisiting a Landmark’: Indirect Expropriation and Fair and Equitable 
Treatment in the ICSID Case Tecmed, 3 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1, 10-13 (2006). 
199  Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2, ¶ 122 (May 29, 2003).   
200  S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Gov’t of Canada, Partial Award, 40 I.L.M. 1408, ¶¶ 215, 
221,  255 (Nov. 13, 2000). 
201  See, e.g., Azurix Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12 (2006). 
See also Total S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision on Liability, 
¶ 197 (Aug. 25, 2006) (finding the measure of pesification of the economy was “a 
bona fide regulatory measure of general application, which was reasonable . . . 
and proportionate to the aim of facing such an emergency”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
WAGNER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2015  4:03 PM 
50 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 36:1 
State’s purpose.”202  Importantly, unlike the holding in Tecmed, it 
found that social welfare considerations must stand behind 
property rights “where the State’s action is obviously 
disproportionate to the need being addressed.”203  In El Paso v. 
Argentina and Continental Casualty v. Argentina, the tribunal found 
that as long as measures were generally applicable they would 
only be compensable if they were “unreasonable, i.e. arbitrary, 
discriminatory, disproportionate or otherwise unfair” 204  or 
“intolerable, discriminatory or disproportionate.”205 
 
3.2.1.1.5. Legitimate Investment-Backed 
Expectations 
 
A final criterion oftentimes mentioned is the extent to which an 
investor relies on expectations at the beginning of the investment 
and to what extent the investor could foresee changing 
circumstances in the regulatory structure.  It is clear that these 
expectations must not be entirely left to the subjective assessment 
of the investor, but must be objectified in some way. 206   The 
assessment of whether a particular investor has suffered 
deprivations that were unexpected is itself not wholly objective.  
But, as the Chinn case before the PCIJ already made clear, investors 
constantly face changing circumstances and not all expectations 
must necessarily be fulfilled.207  Moreover, states may change the 
regulatory structure over time and investors are not immune to 
changing market conditions or changing regulatory environments.  
What is important then is not that the regulatory landscape 
changes, but that the circumstances change either dramatically or 
                                                             
202  LG&E v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶ 
189-94 (Oct. 3, 2006). 
203  Id. ¶ 195. 
204  El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, 
Award, ¶ 241 (Apr. 27, 2006). 
205  Cont’l Casualty Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 
276 (Sept. 5, 2008). 
206  YANNACA-SMALL, supra note 166, at 474. 
207  Oscar Chinn (U.K. v. Belg.), 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 63 (Dec. 12, 1934). 
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abruptly, or both.208   
An inquiry into the propriety of a regulatory change requires 
an investigation of the circumstances and deliberations of the time 
prior to the investment, for instance what type of promises were 
made at that time and what expectations were raised with respect 
to the time that a particular project would be permitted.209  This 
was an issue in the Methanex case, which dealt with a California 
ban on a fuel additive (MTBE).  The tribunal stated that 
compensation required a showing of “specific commitments” that 
“had been given by the regulating government to the then putative 
foreign investor contemplating investment that the government 
would refrain from such regulation.” 210   Moreover, in that 
particular case, the tribunal found that investors must have been 
aware of the potential for changing regulatory circumstances, 
especially with regard to health or environmental issues.211   
Taken together, these points were summarized by the Feldman 
tribunal, which stated that “[g]overnments, in their exercise of 
regulatory power, frequently change their laws and regulations in 
                                                             
208 A different standard was contemplated in the Tecmed case, according to 
which  
[a] foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, 
free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the 
foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and 
regulations that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the 
relevant policies and administrative practices or directives, to be able to 
plan its investment and comply with such regulations.  
Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 154 (May 29, 2003).  While this statement was made 
obiter dictum, it has been cited approvingly by subsequent tribunals, e.g., MTD 
Equity Sdn. Bhd and MTD Chile SA v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case ARB/01/7, 
Award, ¶ 114 (May 25, 2004); Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v. 
Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case UN 3467, Final Award, ¶ 185 (Jul. 1, 2004); 
Eureko BV v. Republic of Poland, Partial Award, ¶ 235 (Aug. 19, 2005).  
209  Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, 
Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, ¶ 150 (May 29, 2003); and Azurix Corp. v. 
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12 (2006), ¶ 316. 
210  Methanex Corp. v. United States, NAFTA-UNCITRAL, Ch. 11, Part IV-
Ch. D, Final Award, ¶ 7 (Aug. 3, 2005). 
211  Id. at 10.  But see generally Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. 
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶¶ 124–27, 150 
(May 29, 2003).  The tribunal decided that in the process of deciding whether to 
invest in the landfill, the investors substantially relied on a useful lifespan of ten 
years for the operation. 
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response to changing economic circumstances or changing 
political, economic or social considerations. Those changes may 
well make certain activities less profitable or even uneconomic to 
continue.”212 
A number of tribunals have taken a different approach than the 
previously held “sole effect” doctrine, which focused almost 
exclusively on the economic impact of a measure with respect to 
the investor.  The Saluka decision is instructive in this regard: 
 
Faced with the question of when, how and at what point an 
otherwise valid regulation becomes, in fact and effect, an 
unlawful expropriation, international tribunals must consider 
the circumstances in which the question arises.  The context 
within which an impugned measure is adopted and applied 
is critical to the determination of its validity.213 
 
Realizing that legitimate investment-backed expectations 
deserve protection while simultaneously recognizing that 
regulatory frameworks are subject to change over time (due to 
scientific discoveries, developments in risk assessment or shifting 
societal attitudes) is important, as it allows for greater coherence in 
distinguishing two situations: those in which compensation is 
required, from those in which an investor simply faces a different 
regulatory environment and must bear the risk associated with an 
investment. 
 Only a small number of tribunals have recognized this 
distinction, because very few cases in which true regulatory 
changes occurred have been decided.  As the Pope and Talbot 
tribunal explained, it is important to keep in mind in this context 
that “a blanket exception for regulatory measures would create a 
gaping loophole in international protections against 
expropriations.” 214   The danger in allowing many measures to 
escape compensation because the state could invoke the moniker 
                                                             
212  Marvin Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, ¶ 
112 (Dec. 16, 2002). 
213  Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, ¶ 264 (Mar. 
17, 2006). 
214  Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, NAFTA-UNCITRAL Ch. 11, Damages, ¶ 99 
(May 31, 2002). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss1/1
WAGNER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2015  4:03 PM 
2014] REGULATORY SPACE 53 
“regulation,” when such compensation would otherwise be 
justified, is clear.  Yet relying on the economic impact of any 
measure without taking into account the wider context in which a 
particular measure takes place appears problematic.  The proper 
weight to lend to these factors cannot be determined in the 
abstract, but rather it is the task of adjudicators to properly weigh 
and balance the evidence presented to them.  There may well be 
times in which the economic effect on an investor is the most 
important element of the overall equation, though in practice such 
instances may be rare in true regulatory expropriation cases.  The 
changing nature of investment arbitration already underway will 
determine whether this line of cases will continue into the future.   
 
3.2.1.2. Summary 
 
The Feldman tribunal has carefully summarized the problem 
that regulatory action poses: 
 
The Tribunal notes that the ways in which governmental 
authorities may force a company out of business, or 
significantly reduce the economic benefits of its business, 
are many. In the past, confiscatory taxation, denial of access 
to infrastructure or necessary raw materials, imposition of 
unreasonable regulatory regimes, among others, have been 
considered to be expropriatory actions.  At the same time, 
governments must be free to act in the broader public 
interest through protection of the environment, new or 
modified tax regimes, the granting or withdrawal of 
government subsidies, reductions or increases in tariff 
levels, imposition of zoning restrictions and the like. 
Reasonable governmental regulation of this type cannot be 
achieved if any business that is adversely affected may seek 
compensation, and it is safe to say that customary 
international law recognizes this.215 
                                                             
215  Marvin Feldman v. Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, ¶ 
112 (Dec. 16, 2002). 
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When evaluating these circumstances, coming up with a 
bright–line approach is a difficult, if not impossible, task.  One of 
the core questions is thus the proper balancing between the rights 
of the investor and the ability of governments to regulate.  
Carefully balancing the elements of discrimination, the extent of 
interference with property rights, the purpose of governmental 
action, proportionality, and the legitimate expectations of the 
investor becomes key and does not allow for mechanical 
evaluation.216   
This leaves considerable discretion on the part of decision 
makers in the interpretation of almost all of these factors,217 leading 
some to resign themselves to referencing Potter Stewart218 when 
they say, “I know it when I see it.” 219   But the growing 
jurisprudence appears to indicate that the sole criterion of 
economic impact is no longer a view that is likely to prevail in the 
future.  The 2012 U.S. Model BIT encapsulates similar rules when it 
posits, in the context of expropriation, that the economic impact of 
government action is not the sole criterion for determining whether 
an indirect expropriation exists.  Other factors include “the extent 
to which the government action interferes with distinct, reasonable 
investment-backed expectations” as well as “the character of the 
government action.”220  Moreover, the 2012 Model BIT explicitly 
states in Article 4(b) the right to regulate:  “Except in rare 
circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party 
that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare 
objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do 
not constitute indirect expropriations.”221 
 
 
                                                             
216  In this sense, calls for maintaining the sole effect doctrine are misguided, 
as only the totality of circumstances may provide a tribunal with all of the 
necessary facts to make appropriate findings.  This debate has crystallized in 
WTO law in the context of the SPS Agreement.  See generally Wagner, supra note 
67, at 192 et seq.  
217  For an overview of the literature, see Ratner, supra note 76, at 484. 
218  See generally Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964). 
219  See generally Fortier & Drymer, supra note 156, at 327. 
220  United States 2012 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, Annex B, art. 4, ¶ a, 
§§ ii-iii, 2012.  
221  Id. at Annex B, art. 4, ¶ b.  
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3.2.2. WTO Law:  Trade Regulation in the SPS and TBT Areas 
 
Under the WTO Agreement, the so-called standard of review 
has undergone considerable debate since the inception of the 
institution.222  Indeed, the debate in WTO law has concentrated on 
this procedural vision of the extent to which WTO dispute 
settlement organs can make inquiries into domestic regulatory 
decisions.  Rather than adding to the existing general literature, 
this section focuses on how the WTO’s dispute settlement organs 
and scholars have debated the question of how much regulatory 
space WTO members should be accorded.  This has been 
particularly at issue in cases concerning the SPS 223  and TBT 
Agreements.224  
The AB in the Hormones case remarked on the delicate balance 
that must be struck between permitting WTO members the 
necessary regulatory space and ascertaining that domestic 
measures are not taken for protectionist purposes. 225   This 
statement embodies the realization that while adjudication by 
panels and the AB may evaluate to what extent a member is in 
compliance with its obligations and thus fulfill its role of ensuring 
the “security and predictability [of] the multilateral trading 
                                                             
222  Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of 
Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 193 (1996); ROSS 
BECROFT, THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: CRITIQUE AND 
DEVELOPMENT (2012); Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Nicolas Lockhart, Standard of 
Review in WTO Law, 7 J.  INT’L ECON. L. 491 (2004); Matthias Oesch, Standards of 
Review in WTO Dispute Resolution, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 635 (2003).  
     223  David G. Victor, The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreeement of the World 
Trade Organization: An Assessment After Five Years, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
865, 875 (1999–00); SPS Agreement, supra note 141.  
224  TBT Agreement, supra note 142.  This section outlines the pertinent legal 
questions surrounding the regulatory space according to WTO members within 
disputes concerning the SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement. 
225  Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat 
and Meat Products (Hormones), ¶ 115, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter 
EC – Hormones Appellate Body Report] (stating that the SPS Agreement reflects 
the “balance established . . . between the jurisdictional competences conceded by 
the Members to the WTO and the jurisdictional competences retained by the 
Members for themselves.”); see generally Appellate Body Report, United States—
Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, ¶¶ 92–96, 
WT/DS406/AB/R (Apr. 4, 2012) [hereinafter US – Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body 
Report]. 
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system,”226 the determination of what the applicable standard of 
review consists of is also a political statement over the distribution 
of power between different levels in a multi-level governance 
system such as the WTO. 
 
3.2.2.1. SPS Agreement 
 
The SPS Agreement allows members to take measures to 
protect human, animal, and plant life or health from sanitary and 
phytosanitary risks.  It does so by employing a science-based 
approach.  For example, WTO members wishing to block the 
importation of goods on the basis of a risk involving human, 
animal, or plant life or health need to produce scientific evidence 
justifying the measure.  Article 2.2 SPS Agreement specifically 
demands that measures be “based on scientific principles” and 
“not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence.” 227  
Combined with the rules contained in Articles 3.1 and 3.2 SPS 
Agreement, which encourage members to follow international 
standards in developing internal measures and which create a 
rebuttable presumption of WTO consistency of an internal 
measure, the SPS Agreement elevates international standards in 
the subject matters covered by the SPS Agreement to a quasi-
requirement.  Under Article 3.3 SPS Agreement, deviations from 
such international standards in order to meet a higher level of 
protection must be justified with scientific evidence. 228   This 
involves procedural and substantive requirements, such as 
carrying out a new risk assessment,229 which compels members to 
“take into account available scientific evidence.” 230   Only in 
circumstances in which “scientific evidence is insufficient” are 
WTO members allowed to deviate from international standards, 
provided that these members “seek to obtain the additional 
                                                             
226  DSU, supra note 99, art. 3.2. 
227  SPS Agreement, supra note 141, art. 2.2.  
228  Appellate Body Report, Australia—Measures Affecting the Importation of 
Apples from New Zealand, ¶ 237, WT/DS367/AB/R (Nov. 29, 2010). 
229  SPS Agreement, supra note 141, art. 5.1. 
230  Id. art. 5.2. 
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information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk,” 
which has to be carried out “within a reasonable period of time.”231  
What follows is a more detailed analysis of the SPS Agreement 
provisions as they relate to the degree to which WTO members 
enjoy regulatory space in their decision-making process concerning 
SPS matters.232 
WTO members, while having the right to take WTO measures 
under Article 2.1 SPS Agreement, must adhere to a number of 
requirements in order to be in compliance with the SPS Agreement.  
The basic obligation contained in Article 2.2 SPS Agreement lays 
out that any measure is limited in scope “only to the extent 
necessary” and must be based on “scientific principles and . . . not 
maintained without sufficient scientific evidence.”233   This basic 
obligation is buttressed by Article 5.1 SPS Agreement, which 
mandates that a risk assessment be carried out when putting in 
place measures that deviate from international standards.234  Under 
the AB’s jurisprudence, the measure that a WTO member puts in 
place must show “the existence of a sufficient or adequate 
relationship” with the scientific evidence that the WTO member 
has acquired.235  Sufficiency requires verifiable data to support the 
conclusions and a “certain level of objectivity.”236  While this may 
indicate that a higher evidentiary threshold is necessary for more 
trade-restrictive measures, the AB has consistently pointed out that 
WTO members also enjoy latitude – i.e. regulatory space – when it 
remarked “responsible, representative governments commonly act 
from perspectives of prudence and precaution where risks of 
                                                             
231  Id. art. 5.7. 
232  See generally Wagner, supra note 67; TRACEY EPPS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
AND HEALTH PROTECTION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE WTO’S SPS AGREEMENT 
(Alan O. Sykes & Mary E. Footer eds., 2008); JACQUELINE PEEL, SCIENCE AND RISK 
REGULATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010). 
233  SPS Agreement, supra note 141, arts. 2.1–2.2. 
234  Id. art. 5.1. 
235  Appellate Body Report, Japan—Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, ¶ 
80, WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Japan – Agricultural Products II 
Appellate Body Report]. 
236  Panel Report, Australia—Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon (Recourse 
to Article 21.5 by Canada), ¶ 7.48, WT/DS18/RW (Feb. 18, 2000).  See generally also 
Appellate Body Report, Japan—Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, ¶ 84, 
WT/DS245/AB/R (Nov. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Japan – Apples Appellate Body 
Report]. 
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irreversible, e.g. life-terminating, damage to human health are 
concerned.”237   
International standards play a large role in determining 
whether a WTO member is in compliance with WTO law.238  In 
order to achieve a higher level of harmonization, the SPS 
Agreement is designed so that WTO members are in quasi-
automatic compliance if their measures are “based on the relevant 
international standards, guidelines or recommendations.” 239  
Promulgated outside the ambit of the WTO itself, 240  the SPS 
Agreement allows WTO members to put in place measures that 
result in a higher level of protection than that provided by 
international standards.  In such instances however, WTO 
members have to provide scientific justification for deviating from 
an international standard. 
The contention in most situations concerning an SPS measure 
is, therefore, if and to what extent a WTO member has scientific 
evidence to back up the need for a higher level of protection than 
that afforded by an international standard.  A WTO member is 
then obligated to carry out a risk assessment under Articles 5.1–5.3 
SPS Agreement.  In this context, the AB’s jurisprudence has 
                                                             
237  EC – Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 225, ¶ 124.  
238  See Markus Wagner, International Standards, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
THE WTO AND TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 238 (Tracey Epps & Michael J. 
Trebilcock eds., 2014) for an overview of the importance of international 
standards in the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.  See JUNJI NAKAGAWA, 
INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION OF ECONOMIC REGULATION (Jonathan Bloch & 
Tara Cannon trans., 2011), for the development and application of standards in 
international economic law. 
239  SPS Agreement, supra note 141, arts. 3.1–3.2.  See generally Terence P. 
Stewart & David S. Johanson, The SPS Agreement of the World Trade Organization 
and the International Trade of Dairy Products, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 55, 57 (1999); 
David G. Victor, The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreeement of the World Trade 
Organization: An Assessment After Five Years, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 865, 875 
(2000). 
240  The Codex Alimentarius Commission develops standards, guidelines, 
and recommendations for food safety relating to food additives, veterinary drug 
and pesticide residues, contaminants, methods of analysis and sampling, and 
codes and guidelines of hygienic practice.  The International Office of Epizootics 
develops relevant standards, guidelines, and recommendations for animal health 
and zoonosis.  The Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention, in 
cooperation with regional organizations operating within the framework of the 
International Plant Protection Convention for plant health, develops international 
standards, guidelines, and recommendations for plant health.   
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss1/1
WAGNER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2015  4:03 PM 
2014] REGULATORY SPACE 59 
recognized that the factors that WTO members may consider are 
not limited to those that Article 5.2 SPS Agreement mentions, and 
that a member’s measures do not take place in a laboratory, but 
rather in “human societies as they actually exist, in other words, 
the actual potential for adverse effects on human health in the real 
world where people live and work and die.”241  This leaves open 
the question—thus far unanswered by the AB or the panels—
whether non-scientific factors (e.g. cultural preferences or 
subjective positions such as different societal risk perceptions) can 
be taken into consideration.242  While some authors claim that there 
is only a “low empirical barrier” to be crossed, 243  the AB’s 
jurisprudence in EC—Hormones indicates a considerable amount of 
caution and maintains a central role for scientific evidence.  The 
EC—Hormones case makes clear that states have regulatory space 
only after substantial empirical barriers have been overcome.  It is, 
however, also an indication that the AB – unlike the panels 
deciding SPS cases244  – has recognized that there is a complex 
interplay of factors that goes beyond the laboratory setting. 
The AB has taken a similarly permissive approach to a number 
of other questions.  Regarding what level of risk WTO members 
have to accept, it recognized the accountability that domestic 
decision-makers have when deciding whether to institute an SPS 
measure.  It thus allowed WTO members to use minority 
viewpoints in the scientific community and required only an 
inquiry to “determine whether that risk assessment is supported 
by coherent reasoning and respectable scientific evidence[,] . . .” 
provided that it meets “standards of the relevant scientific 
                                                             
241  EC – Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 225, ¶ 187.  See generally 
Japan – Apples Appellate Body Report, supra note 236, ¶ 207. 
242  David Winickoff et al., Adjudicating the GM Food Wars: Science, Risk, and 
Democracy in World Trade Law, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 81, 85 (2005) (“[V]alue judgments 
and public participation play an important role in generating reliable and 
conclusive risk assessments, especially in new and contested risk situations.”); 
Caroline E. Foster, Public Opinion and the Interpretation of the World Trade 
Organisation’s Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
427, 427 (2008) (advocating a democratic approach to risk-taking).  
243  M. Gregg Bloche, WTO Deference to National Health Policy: Toward an 
Interpretive Principle, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 825, 837 (2002). 
244  Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones), ¶¶ 8.91-8.160, 8.94-8.100 (Aug. 18, 1997) [hereinafter EC – 
Hormones Panel Report].  
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community.”245  Similarly, the AB held that when implementing a 
measure subsequent to carrying out a risk assessment, a measure 
must have an “objective relationship” to the risk assessment and 
must have been “sufficiently warrant[ed].”246  The panel had earlier 
required a much stricter nexus, interpreting the meaning of the 
term “based on” as having to conform much more strictly to the 
results of the risk assessment.247 
Finally, the SPS Agreement is cognizant of the fact that there is 
a considerable amount of uncertainty in virtually all scientific 
inquiry.  Article 5.7 SPS Agreement was found to reflect the 
precautionary principle and operates as a “qualified exemption” to 
other provisions of the SPS Agreement. 248   Article 5.7 SPS 
Agreement requires a showing of the following: (1) insufficient 
scientific evidence; (2) a measure must be adopted “on the basis of 
available pertinent information;” (3) a WTO member invoking this 
provision must seek additional scientific information; and (4) the 
measure is subject to review within a “reasonable period of 
time.”249  
The reflection of the precautionary principle indicates a certain 
amount of regulatory space, provided that these preconditions are 
met.  Again, however, the AB made clear that the regulatory space 
given to WTO members is not unlimited.  The provision may only 
be invoked in situations in which “the body of available scientific 
evidence does not allow, in quantitative or qualitative terms, the 
performance of an adequate assessment of risks.”250  At the same 
time, the AB rebuked attempts by the panel level251 to mandate a 
“critical mass” standard “that would call into question the 
fundamental precepts of previous knowledge and evidence so as to 
make relevant, previously sufficient, evidence now insufficient.”252  
                                                             
245  Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued  Suspension, ¶¶ 590–91, 
WT/DS320/AB/R (Oct. 16, 2008) [hereinafter US – Continued Suspension 
Appellate Body Report]. 
246  EC – Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 225, ¶¶ 189, 193. 
247  EC – Hormones Panel Report, supra note 244, ¶ 8.137.  
248  Japan – Agricultural Products II Appellate Body Report, supra note 235.  
249  Id. ¶ 89. 
250  Japan – Apples Appellate Body Report, supra note 236, ¶ 179.  See generally 
also US – Continued Suspension Appellate Body Report, supra note 245, ¶ 674.  
251  Id. ¶¶ 703–05. 
252  Panel Report, United States—Continued Suspension of Obligations in the 
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In order to rely on a minority viewpoint, the AB found it sufficient 
that a member provide a “qualified and respected scientific view 
that puts into question the relationship between the relevant 
scientific evidence and the conclusions in relation to risk, thereby 
not permitting the performance of a sufficiently objective 
assessment of risk on the basis of the existing scientific 
evidence.”253  In these areas, the AB’s findings in general comport 
with a more lenient approach than that accorded to WTO members 
by the panels.254   
 
3.2.2.2. TBT Agreement 
 
The situation with respect to the TBT Agreement has recently 
been clarified to a certain extent through a number of WTO 
decisions. 255   These disputes arose in quick succession after a 
relative dearth of cases concerning the TBT Agreement.  Although 
none of these cases has dealt with the issue of regulatory space in 
greater detail, a close reading of the cases reveals a general 
approach towards how the issue of regulatory space is to be dealt 
with under the TBT Agreement.  The findings in these cases 
involved a balancing between the dual goals of liberalizing trade 
and preserving a member’s right to pursue legitimate policy 
                                                             
EC—Hormones Dispute, ¶ 7.648, WT/DS320/R (Mar. 31, 2008).  See generally 
Wagner, supra note 67, at 177–78. 
253  US – Continued Suspension Appellate Body Report, supra note 245, ¶ 677. 
254  See generally Wagner, supra note 67, at 194 et seq. 
255  Appellate Body Report, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling 
(COOL) Requirements, WT/DS384/AB/R, WT/DS386/R (June 29, 2012) 
[hereinafter US – COOL Appellate Body Report]; Appellate Body Report, United 
States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna 
Products, WT/DS381/AB/R (May 16, 2012) [hereinafter US – Tuna II Appellate 
Body Report]; Panel Report, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling 
(COOL) Requirements, WT/DS384/R, WT/DS386/R (Nov. 18, 2011) [hereinafter 
US – COOL Panel Report]; Panel Report, United States – Measures Concerning the 
Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/R (Sept. 15, 
2011) [hereinafter US – Tuna II Panel Report]; Panel Report, United States – 
Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/R (Sept. 2, 
2011) [hereinafter US - Clove Cigarettes Panel Report]; US – Clove Cigarettes 
Appellate Body Report, supra note 225.  See generally RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
WTO AND TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE (Tracey Epps & Michael J. Trebilcock 
eds., 2014). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
WAGNER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2015  4:03 PM 
62 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 36:1 
objectives.256  The starting point for this analysis is Article 2.2 TBT 
Agreement, which includes helpful elements to identify the 
amount of regulatory space that WTO members have: 
 
Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not 
prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the 
effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international 
trade. For this purpose, technical regulations shall not be 
more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate 
objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would 
create.257 
 
The provision entails elements that can be pursued in trying to 
identify the regulatory space that WTO members have:  including 
that a technical regulation (1) pursue a legitimate objective, (2) is 
not to be prepared, adopted or applied so as erect unnecessary 
obstacles to trade, (3) is no more trade restrictive than necessary, 
and (4) Members take account of the risk that non-fulfillment may 
create. 
Similar to Article 5.2 SPS Agreement, 258  Article 2.2 TBT 
Agreement contains a list of legitimate objectives that may be 
pursued, such as national security, the prevention of deceptive 
practices, the protection of human health or safety, animal or plant 
life or health, or the environment.259  The wording indicates clearly 
that these objectives are not exhaustive, and that WTO members 
may invoke other objectives. 260   The AB and the panel have 
reinforced this interpretation on numerous occasions.  For 
example, in the Sardines case, the European Community made the 
argument that a Codex Alimentarius standard was an ineffective 
or inappropriate means for the fulfillment of legitimate objectives 
                                                             
256  See US - Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 225, ¶¶ 92-96 
(recognizing that “Members’ right[s] to regulate should not be constrained if the 
measures taken are necessary to fulfil certain legitimate policy objectives,” 
provided such measures do not constitute a “disguised restriction on international 
trade”). 
257  TBT Agreement, supra note 142, art. 2.2.  
258  SPS Agreement, supra note 141, art. 5.2. 
259  TBT Agreement, supra note 142, art. 2.2.  
260  See id.  
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because it failed to meet three objectives:  consumer protection, 
market transparency, and fair competition.261  In U.S. – Tuna II, the 
AB interpreted Article 2.2 TBT Agreement as containing a non-
exhaustive list of legitimate objectives, which were intended as 
“examples” to “provide a reference point for which other 
objectives may be considered to be legitimate in the sense of Article 
2.2.” 262   The AB also noted that “objectives recognized in the 
provisions of other covered agreements may provide guidance for, 
or may inform, the analysis of what might be considered a 
legitimate objective under Article 2.2.” 263   In Clove Cigarettes, 
Indonesia unsuccessfully challenged the legitimacy of the United 
States’ stated objective, i.e. the reduction of youth smoking.264  
In the COOL case, the United States declared that the objective 
of the provision was to provide consumer information about the 
origins of certain meat products, thereby preventing confusion on 
the side of the consumer.265  Procedurally, the AB reinforced the 
point made by the panel, namely that it is incumbent on the 
complaining party to prove that a measure did not pursue a 
legitimate objective.266  Substantively, the AB left no doubt that it is 
a legitimate objective for a WTO member to convey to consumers 
product information for the purposes of preventing deceptive 
practices and protecting consumers.267  The AB in COOL reiterated 
its position from U.S. – Tuna II, pointing not only to the text of 
Article 2.2 TBT Agreement itself,268 but also to other provisions, 
such as the preamble of the TBT Agreement, and Articles XX(b), 
XX(d), and IX GATT.269  The preamble recognizes that a member 
shall not be prevented from taking measures necessary to achieve 
                                                             
261  Panel Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, ¶ 7.113, 
WT/DS231/R (May 29, 2002).  See generally Committee on Technical Barriers to 
Trade, Eighteenth Annual Review of the Implementation and Operation of the TBT 
Agreement, ¶ 2.2, G/TBT/33 (Feb. 27, 2013). 
262  US – Tuna II Appellate Body Report, supra note 255, ¶ 313. 
263  Id. 
264  US – Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 255, ¶¶ 7.345 
265  US - COOL Panel Report, supra note 255, ¶ 7.581. 
266  US - COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 255, ¶¶ 442, 449. 
267  US - COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 255, ¶ 451. 
268  Id. ¶ 451. 
269  Id. ¶¶ 445, 462.   
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its legitimate objectives “at the levels it considers appropriate.”270  
Canada argued in COOL that, when a WTO member pursues an 
objective not specifically listed in Article 2.2 TBT Agreement, such 
an objective has to conform to the “significant elements of 
commonality of the explicitly listed objectives” found in that 
provision.271  The AB disagreed, noting that even though Canada 
had not elaborated on alleged elements of commonality that would 
“illuminate the relevant type of objective” and thus serve to 
delineate the class of legitimate objectives that fall within Article 
2.2 TBT Agreement, it would be “difficult to discern such 
commonality amongst the disparate listed objectives that are, 
moreover, ‘expressed at a high level of generality.’”272  The AB 
concluded that “any relevant ‘commonality’ would have to relate 
to the nature and content of those objectives themselves,” and 
rejected Canada’s position that such commonality can only be 
found in limited situations where Article 2.2 TBT Agreement 
objectives are explicitly listed in other covered agreements.273 
The range of legitimate objectives is therefore rather wide, but 
subject to the limitation stated in Article 2.2 TBT Agreement, 
namely that any risk assessment must be carried out by taking into 
account the “available scientific and technical information, related 
processing technology or intended end-uses of products.”274 
Article 2.2 TBT Agreement contains two elements that relate to 
a necessity test, specifically the prohibition on “creating 
unnecessary obstacles to international trade” and the requirement 
that technical regulations be “no more trade-restrictive than 
necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective.”  This means that a 
technical regulation that is more trade restrictive than necessary is 
by default an “unnecessary obstacle to international trade.” 275  
                                                             
270  TBT Agreement, supra note 142, at pmbl. (noting that this wide latitude is 
“subject to the requirement that [such measures] are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on 
international trade, and are otherwise in accordance with [the TBT Agreement]”).  
271  US - COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 255, ¶ 435.  
272  Id. ¶ 444.  
273  Id. 
274  TBT Agreement, supra note 142, art. 2.2. 
275  US – Tuna II Appellate Body Report, supra note 255, ¶ 318.  See generally 
Ludivine Tamiotti, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, in MAX PLANCK 
COMMENTARIES ON WORLD TRADE LAW, VOLUME 3: WTO - TECHNICAL BARRIERS AND 
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According to the AB in U.S. – Tuna II, the following factors are 
relevant in determining whether a technical regulation is “more 
trade-restrictive than necessary”:  (i) the degree of contribution 
made by the measure to the legitimate objective at issue, (ii) the 
trade-restrictiveness of the measure, and (iii) the nature of the risks 
at issue and the gravity of consequences that would arise from 
non-fulfillment of the objective(s) pursued through the measure.276  
At the heart of the analysis is a comparison between the challenged 
measure and an alternative measure that is less trade restrictive, 
but still capable of achieving the government’s legitimate objective.   
The importance of properly identifying the objective pursued by 
the measure becomes evident when taking into account that the AB 
has developed a jurisprudence in which the weighing and 
balancing that takes place is highly dependent on the competing 
values in any situation.277  In the Clove Cigarettes case, the U.S. 
proffered human health and safety, and specifically the reduction 
of youth smoking, as its objective.278  The panel found, referring to 
the AB’s jurisprudence in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, that there was “a 
genuine relationship of ends and means” between the objective 
pursued and the measure at issue. 279   In U.S. – Tuna II, the 
objectives of the measure at hand were the protection of animals 
and the prevention of deceptive practices that could mislead 
consumers.280  Importantly, the AB came to the conclusion that the 
alternative measure proposed by Mexico – catching Tuna by 
“setting on dolphins” – would not “achieve the United States’ 
objectives to an equivalent degree as the measure at issue.” 281  
Rather, the alternative measure would contribute to a higher 
mortality rate among dolphins and lead to other adverse health 
effects in dolphin populations.282  In the final case, U.S. – COOL, 
the AB made findings with respect to all three of the elements of 
the analysis set forth in U.S. – Tuna II.  Applying the three-factor 
U.S. – Tuna II analysis, the AB found that:  (i) while the COOL 
                                                             
SPS MEASURES mn. 16 (Rüdiger Wolfrum et al. eds., 2007).  
276  US – Tuna II Appellate Body Report, supra note 255, ¶ 322. 
277  US - COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 255, ¶ 387.  
278  US – Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 255, ¶ 7.347. 
279  Id. ¶ 7.417. 
280  US – Tuna II Appellate Body Report, supra note 255, ¶ 303. 
281  Id. ¶ 330. 
282  Id. 
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measures made some contribution to the objective pursued – 
conveying to consumers information as to the origin of meat 
products and thereby preventing deceptive practices – it was 
unable to ascertain the degree to which the measure contributed to 
the objective; 283  (ii) the measures were considerably trade-
restrictive because of the limiting effect of the measure on the 
competitive opportunities for imported livestock compared to the 
situation before the COOL measures took effect;284 and (iii) the 
consequences that may arise from the non-fulfillment of the 
objective would not be particularly grave, as the unwillingness of 
consumers to pay for the measure was not widespread.285   
 
3.2.2.3. Summary 
 
The analysis undertaken by the AB in the TBT cases discussed 
above is similar to the AB jurisprudence in the areas of the GATT 
and the SPS Agreement.  In the case of the GATT, there has been a 
move away from a “least-restrictive means” test to one that is 
“less-restrictive means” based, supplemented by a proportionality 
test that weighs and balances a series of factors, including:  the 
contribution made by the compliance measure to the enforcement 
of the law or regulation at issue; the importance of the common 
interests or values protected by that law or regulation; and the 
accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports or 
exports.286  The “weighing and balancing” was further explained 
by the AB in EC – Asbestos, when the AB posited that, the more 
important the common values pursued, the more easily the WTO 
dispute settlement organs would accept the necessity of a 
Member’s measure “designed to achieve those ends.”287  The effect 
of this jurisprudence is that the AB provided WTO members with 
regulatory space when taking internal measures.  The AB’s 
                                                             
283  US - COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 255, at 476. 
284  Id. ¶ 477. 
285  Id. ¶ 478. 
286  Korea – Various Measures on Beef Appellate Body Report, supra note 138, ¶ 
164.  See generally ANDREW D. MITCHELL, LEGAL PRINCIPLES IN WTO DISPUTES 177 et 
seq. (James Crawford & John S. Bell eds., 2008). 
287  EC – Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 134, ¶ 172.  
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jurisprudence with respect to the SPS Agreement, as shown above, 
has similarly provided WTO members such regulatory space when 
taking SPS measures.  However, this discretion is not unfettered.  
The AB’s TBT Agreement jurisprudence shows a similar trajectory, 
though with a somewhat more cautious stance.288  It does so on the 
basis of its general approach with respect to the TBT Agreement 
which has been to balance the “desire to avoid creating 
unnecessary obstacles to international trade” and “the recognition 
of Members’ right to regulate.”289   Given the AB’s tendency to 
provide more regulatory space when vital or highly important 
values are at stake, it is not surprising that this is especially true in 
cases where human health or life is concerned, whereas the same 
may not be true in instances when the values are considered to be 
less important. 
 
3.3. Regulatory Space for Domestic Decision-Makers:  Converging 
Trends in Trade and Investment Law? 
 
 The analysis of the ways in which international trade and 
investment law deal with the question of how much regulatory 
space is to be accorded to states or WTO members has shown a 
trend towards convergence of the two fields, though important 
differences remain. 
One important difference, further elaborated below, is the 
institutional setting of each field.  While the WTO has an integrated 
dispute settlement mechanism for arbitrating trade law issues, 
international investment law is far more disparate in both its 
substantive and procedural rules.  Moreover, the existence of a 
WTO appellate mechanism has led to the development of a 
jurisprudence, which, while not always uniform, has attained a 
much greater degree of coherence than is the case in international 
investment law. 290   The existence of a dispute settlement 
                                                             
288  Mitchell & Henckels, supra note 39, at 161. 
289  US – Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 225, ¶ 96.  
290  See Thomas Schultz, Against Consistency in Investment Arbitration, in THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRINGING THEORY INTO 
PRACTICE (King’s Coll. London – The Dickinson Poon Sch. of Law, Research Paper 
No. 2013-3) (providing a view that investment law as a field should shun 
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mechanism and a relatively consistent line of cases elicit a clearer 
jurisprudence with respect to the amount of regulatory space that 
is being accorded to WTO members.   
Properly understood, regulatory space is not an occasion for 
states or WTO members to decide in an unfettered manner 
whether to either treat investors in contravention of the existing 
investment agreements or to prohibit a product from entering a 
WTO member’s territory.  Rather, it is the recognition that, under 
particular circumstances a state or a WTO member has discretion – 
within limits – to deny the (full) enjoyment of an investment or the 
importation of a particular product, provided that a justification 
can be provided.  Like other dispute settlement organs, the AB has 
attempted to delineate this regulatory space between two 
competing goals:  permitting WTO members to react to situations 
in which particular values may be at risk, while trying at the same 
time to curb potential abuse. 
The recognition that the WTO’s approach before 1995 or 
directly after 1995 did not take account of the complexities that 
WTO members face has led to a shift of the jurisprudence of the 
dispute settlement organs.  This is the case with respect to the 
GATT after the AB’s decision in Korea – Beef in which the AB 
openly introduced not only a different conception of necessity 
(from least-restrictive means testing to less-restrictive means 
testing), but also proportionality testing through a process it 
described as “weighing and balancing.” 291   The Korea – Beef 
approach enables the AB to more adequately react to situations or 
new developments as they arise and contextualize its response 
depending on the different elements that factor into the “weighing 
and balancing.”  Such a development is not without risk, namely 
because of the inherent power shift towards adjudicatory bodies.  
These measures – recalibrating necessity within a larger move to 
proportionality analysis – contribute to a wider regulatory space 
for WTO members.  Similarly, the jurisprudence of the AB has 
                                                             
consistency for its own sake) (forthcoming).  See generally Arato, supra note 40, at 
571-578.  But see Federico Ortino, Legal Reasoning of International Investment 
Tribunals: A Typology of Egregious Failures, 3 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 31, 44 (2012) 
(identifying the lack of internal consistency in investment decisions as a “failure in 
the legal reasoning of investment tribunals”). 
291  Korea – Various Measures on Beef Appellate Body Report, supra note 138, 
¶¶ 164, 166. 
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shown – with different scope, as described above – that WTO 
members enjoy a considerable amount of regulatory space under 
both the SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement. 
International investment law is currently witnessing a number 
of discourses that may have profound implications for the field.  
These discourses include the varying schools of thought that 
conceive of international investment law as public law,292 as well as 
other voices that argue over the legitimacy of international 
investment law.293  Some of those discourses revolve around the 
question of to what extent the field should undergo development 
similar to that of international trade law.  Decisions such as SD 
Myers, Glamis, Tecmed and Continental are indications that the field 
is moving towards greater acceptance of values that compete with 
the protection of investors’ rights, and is becoming increasingly 
deferential to states’ regulatory judgments.  This is evident, for 
example, when the panel in Glamis posited that it would invalidate 
a state’s measure only if there was a “manifest lack of reasons for 
the legislation,”294 or when the panel in Lemire v. Ukraine said that it 
was the “inherent right” of a state “to regulate its affairs and adopt 
laws in order to protect the common good of its people, as defined 
by its Parliament and Government.”295  
Yet at the same time, there is considerable disagreement over 
the course that international investment law should take.  Different 
                                                             
292  See, e.g., Schill, supra note 32 (discussing the hybrid nature of investment 
arbitration, which combines substantive public international law and procedural 
international commercial arbitration); Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 75 
(discussing the shift in investor-state arbitration to a new public-law context and 
the need for arbitral tribunals to develop standards for reviewing states’ public 
regulatory activities); SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 57. 
293  Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to 
the Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. OF INT’L L. 471 (2009); Susan 
D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public 
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005); 
Julia Hueckel, Rebalancing Legitimacy and Sovereignty in International Investment 
Agreements, 61 EMORY L.J. 601 (2012).  
294  Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. USA, ICSID, Award, ¶ 805 (June 8, 2009). 
295  Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction 
and Liability, ¶ 505 (Jan. 14, 2010) (referring to the “high measure of deference that 
international law generally extends to the right of domestic authorities to regulate matters 
within their own borders,” especially in cases when “the purpose of the legislation 
affects deeply felt cultural or linguistic traits of the community” [emphasis in 
original]) (quoting S.D. Myers Inc. v. Gov’t of Canada, Partial Award, 40 I.L.M. 
1408, ¶ 263 (NAFTA-UNCITRAL 2000)).  
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tribunals have arrived at different conclusions when interpreting 
the same language and the same general situation.  For example, 
after the peso crisis in Argentina, the ICSID tribunal in Enron took 
a narrow view when applying the necessity test by using general 
international law rules under the law of state responsibility, 296 
whereas the tribunal in Continental Casualty explicitly referenced 
international trade law. 297   Each tribunal arrived at a different 
conclusion in its ruling. 298   Other investment tribunals have 
similarly diverged over what standard is to be applied when 
determining whether a state’s action is in violation of an IIA.299  It 
is also worth mentioning how much the governmental measures 
differ in both fields.  Domestic trade measures generally result in 
restrictions on the importation of a certain commodity into a 
particular country, even though the exporting state is still able to 
sell these goods to markets in other countries.  In matters of 
investment law, investors suffer a potentially greater risk, as 
governmental measures could threaten their investments in their 
entirety. 
The current state of discourse in international investment law 
over the degree to which states should be afforded regulatory 
space can best be described as being in a state of flux.  
Nevertheless, comparing the situation as recent as a decade ago 
with today’s landscape yields a remarkable shift in the discourse.300  
As some have pointed out, the current discourse is under-
theorized.301  There is value – though it is not an end in itself – in 
                                                             
296  Enron Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/3, Award, ¶¶ 322–45 (May 22, 2007). 
297  Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, 
Award, ¶¶ 189–230 (Sept. 5, 2008).  For a critical view of this decision, see José E. 
Alvarez & Tegan Brink, Revisiting the Necessity Defense, Y.B. INT’L  INV. L. & POL’Y 
319 (2010–11).  
298  David Schneiderman, Judicial Politics and International Investment 
Arbitration: Seeking an Explanation for Conflicting Outcomes, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 
383, 384-93, 400-07 (2010).  
299  Caroline Henckels, Balancing Investment Protection and the Public Interest, 4 
J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 197, 203 nn. 34–37 (2013).  See also Arato, supra note 40, 
passim.  
300  Mitchell & Henckels, supra note 39, at 103–26. 
301  Henckels, supra note 299, at 214; Alec Stone Sweet, Investor-State 
Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier, 4 LAW & ETHICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 47, 67-
68 (2010), available at 
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creating an adjudicatory system that provides something similar to 
what the WTO’s DSU calls the “security and predictability [of] the 
multilateral trading system.” 302   Participants in an adjudicatory 
system would be better equipped to anticipate the decisions of a 
tribunal if decisions were made in a more consistent fashion.  
Moreover, by being open and clear about how they adjudicate the 
degree of regulatory space states have, tribunals also contribute to 
dissolving the legitimacy problem–real or perceived–that 
international investment law is facing.  Regardless of what position 
one takes in the debate concerning the desirability of such a 
convergence, 303  there is undeniably a profound shift in the 
international investment law discourse towards the incorporation 
of additional values when evaluating investment claims and thus a 
closer approximation of the jurisprudence of other international 
tribunals, notably that of the WTO.304 
 
4. UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENCES 
 
This section will explain some of the reasons for the differences 
between the fields of international trade and investment law.  It 
focuses on textual, contextual, and institutional explanations for 
these differences, as well as the divergent epistemic communities 
the fields engender.  This is certainly not a complete list, but rather 
an attempt to explain some of the salient differences that account 
for why international trade and investment law have taken 
different approaches to deciding the amount of regulatory space.     
 
4.1. Text and Context 
 
The most significant difference between the two fields is that, 
                                                             
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1569412.   
302  DSU, supra note 99, art. 3.2. 
303  Alvarez & Brink, supra note 297, at 332; Arato, supra note 40, at 558; 
Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 75; Sweet & Mathews, supra note 193, at 
154. 
304  See Henckels, supra note 76, at 224 nn.1-2; Roland Kläger, Fair and 
Equitable Treatment: A Look at the Theoretical Underpinnings of Legitimacy and 
Fairness, 11 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 435, 446–48 (2010). 
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while WTO law has positively codified justifications for 
governments wishing to protect interests that are not 
fundamentally economic, investment treaties have historically not 
included similar provisions.  As outlined above, justificatory 
clauses have only recently become more common in IIAs.  
Therefore, the starting point for the debate on providing regulatory 
space in the two fields is different.  Since the inception of the WTO, 
jurisprudence has developed that takes the justificatory clauses in 
treaty provisions seriously, the most well-known of which is 
Article XX GATT.  For example, the AB stated in U.S. – Shrimp that: 
 
[t]he task of interpreting and applying the chapeau is, 
hence, essentially the delicate one of locating and marking 
out a line of equilibrium between the right of a Member to 
invoke an exception under Article XX and the rights of the 
other Members under varying substantive provisions (e.g., 
Article XI) of the GATT 1994, so that neither of the 
competing rights will cancel out the other and thereby 
distort and nullify or impair the balance of rights and 
obligations constructed by the Members themselves in that 
Agreement.  The location of the line of equilibrium, as 
expressed in the chapeau, is not fixed and unchanging; the 
line moves as the kind and the shape of the measures at 
stake vary and as the facts making up specific cases 
differ.305 
 
The AB has made similar findings regarding the relationship 
between members’ rights306 and the justificatory provisions such as 
those found in Article XX GATT, the SPS Agreement, and the TBT 
Agreement.307 
It may have been easier in the past to forego the recognition of 
regulatory space in international investment law.  Some of the 
reasons include the absence of similar justificatory language in 
international investment law agreements, combined with more 
discrete cases of direct expropriation.  Thus, José Alvarez and 
                                                             
305  US – Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 137, ¶ 159. 
306  See, e.g. GATT, supra note 1, arts. I, III, XI. 
307  See supra Section II, B, 2.   
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Tegan Brink criticize the ICSID tribunal’s Continental decision for 
its adoption of the AB’s Article XX GATT jurisprudence without 
sufficiently explaining the rationale for doing so. 308   Their 
argument that the two-tiered analysis under Article XX GATT – 
first determining which of the justifications in (a) through (j) 
applies, and then deciding whether a measure runs afoul of the 
chapeau – influences the way in which the term “necessary” is 
interpreted, is valid.309  This is the reason why this article does not 
focus on interpreting the term “necessary” on its own, but rather 
uses the concept of regulatory space.  Cases involving the 
distribution of essential services such as water and cases involving 
health or environment or other public concerns have been brought 
before international investment tribunals.310  In these instances – 
and especially in cases where such policy decisions follow a 
genuine democratic process – it will be increasingly difficult to 
avoid according states at least some regulatory space, even in the 
absence of the specific justificatory language that is usually 
contained in more modern BITs.311 
The change that model BITs are undergoing concerning treaty 
language, and the growing variety in the types of challenges that 
are being brought before international investment tribunals, 
coincides with an increase in the number of countries from which 
investments are made.  The addition of justificatory clauses in 
model BITs takes place at roughly the same time when investment 
streams are changing from being predominated by unidirectional 
investments from developed to developing countries to investment 
streams that are increasingly multi-directional.  Countries that 
were previously almost exclusively capital-exporting now find 
themselves being brought before tribunals as respondents in a 
system that they had previously had a great interest in 
maintaining. 
An additional element that is worth pointing out consists of the 
                                                             
308  Alvarez & Brink, supra note 297, at 345.  For a similar criticism concerning 
the neglect of contextual arguments with respect to “likeness,” see Kurtz, supra 
note 39, at 755 et seq. and 759 et seq.  
309  Alvarez & Brink, supra note 297, at 345-48.  But see generally Mitchell & 
Henckels, supra note 39, at 158-59. 
310 Schill, supra note 32, at 3, 14–15.  
311 Alvarez & Brink, supra note 297, at 329; Mitchell & Henckels, supra note 39, 
at 93.  
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functional differences between international trade and investment 
law.  The former has traditionally been portrayed as pitting states 
against a less powerful investor, whereas the latter involves 
disputes between two WTO members.312  Moreover, the purpose of 
WTO law can correctly be summarized as having “twin objectives 
of trade liberalization (positive) and the prevention of 
protectionism (negative).” 313   Traditionally, one of the goals of 
investment law has been the protection of investors against 
powerful states – a goal that is not likely to vanish any time soon.  
The following statement demonstrates this view:  “At [the heart of 
international investment law] lies the right of a private actor to 
engage in an arbitral litigation against a (foreign) government over 
governmental conduct affecting the investor.”314 
But it could be argued that, in certain cases, limiting the goal of 
international investment law solely to the protection of investors is 
a very narrow view of the raison d’être of this field of law.  Rather – 
in parallel to how WTO law has been described – international 
investment law cases involving public policy matters not only have 
the positive objectives of providing protection for investors and the 
promotion of foreign direct investment, but also the negative goal 
of preventing that very protection from allowing responsible 
governments to make public policy choices. 
This ties in significantly with the different remedies available in 
both systems.  WTO law is designed to bring an offending member 
“back into compliance” – in other words, its remedies are entirely 
prospective and any countermeasures can be executed against such 
a member only after the Dispute Settlement Body made a finding 
of non-implementation.  This is a function of the diplomatic origin 
of the GATT / WTO regime and of the desire to incentivize 
members to reposition themselves so that the trade system can 
function at the most efficient state that WTO members agreed 
upon.  By contrast, international investment law’s remedies are – 
by and large – retrospective and are designed to monetarily 
reprimand a state for the wrongs it has inflicted upon an investor.  
There can be no doubt that these differences are important and that 
                                                             
312  Alvarez & Brink, supra note 297, at 349.   
313  Id. at 347.  
314  Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, NAFTA-
UNCITRAL, Separate Opinion by Thomas Wälde, ¶ 13 (Jan. 26, 2006). 
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they play a crucial role in evaluating the different regimes.315  At 
the same time, it is at least worth inquiring whether certain 
regulatory expropriation cases – such as when an investor 
challenges the regulatory fabric of the host state by challenging 
general and abstract provisions concerning, for example, health or 
environmental measures – should be analyzed differently from 
traditional expropriation cases.  It is at least questionable whether, 
in a case concerning the health impact of harmful substances, the 
traditional investment law remedy is truly retrospective.  Given 
that the findings of investment tribunals may deter other states 
from adopting the same measures, investment law can be 
prospective under certain conditions.316 
 
4.2. Institutional Reasons 
 
Another explanation for the differences between investment 
law and trade law with respect to the amount of regulatory space 
lies in the different institutional designs within each field.  As 
discussed above, the adjudicatory systems in the two fields are 
remarkably different.  Two specific and interrelated features of 
investment law, which distinguish it from trade law, are worth 
pointing out – the lack of the existence of an appellate mechanism, 
and the lack of a system of precedent. 
The most salient difference, which critics of the move towards 
more regulatory space in international investment law are quick to 
point out, is the ad hoc nature of international investment law 
adjudication. 317   Unlike WTO law, which has an appellate 
mechanism, international investment law is a radically 
decentralized system with “no authoritative voice” to resolve 
differences. 318   This is unsurprising, given the very nature of 
international investment law with its thousands of individual 
bilateral and multilateral instruments with differing venues, 
                                                             
315  Alan Sykes, Public v. Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Of 
Standing and Remedy, 34 J. LEG. STUD. 631 (2005).  
316  Indeed, Philip Morris’ Notice of Arbitration, supra note 15, ¶ 49, 
demands “discontinuance of the plain packaging legislation.”  
317  Arato, supra note 40, passim; Roberts, supra note 39, at 48. 
318  Roberts, supra note 39, at 48-52.  
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compared to the very existence of the WTO as a unifying 
institution.319  Indeed, this difference leads to divergences in a great 
number of cases.  There have been debates over the years 
concerning the introduction of a “WTO-style” appellate procedure 
in investment law.  Even though the decisions rendered by the 
WTO AB are not binding on the panels or even on the AB itself, its 
findings are nonetheless regularly followed and regarded as 
having precedential value.320 
The lack of an appellate mechanism – suggested in various 
forms321 – in the realm of international investment law has been 
continuously debated over the last decade.322  Most of the criticism 
has been directed at the potential of prolonging disputes and 
endangering the finality of an arbitration award, both of which are 
valued in the current system as important characteristics.323  Given 
the highly fragmented nature of international investment law, it is 
unclear how such an appellate system could actually be 
implemented in practice.  Parties would have to agree to submit to 
an additional layer of scrutiny, and treaties would presumably 
have to be amended.324  It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
                                                             
319  Franck, supra note 293, at 1619-22; Donald McRae, The WTO Appellate 
Body: A Model for an ICSID Appeals Facility?, 1 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 371, 382-86 
(2010). 
320  In particular fields, some panels have been reticent to do so.  For an 
analysis of the different SPS Agreement jurisprudence between various panels 
and the AB, see Wagner, supra note 67, at 194. 
321  See VAN HARTEN, supra note 57, at 180-84; Franck, supra note 293, at 1617-
25; David A. Gantz, An Appellate Mechanism for Review of Arbitral Decisions in 
Investor-State Disputes: Prospects and Challenges, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 39, 54-73 
(2006); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap, IIA Issues Note, 
No. 2, (2013), available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf 
(discussing concerns with the current investment law dispute resolution system, 
including deficit of legitimacy and transparency, and inconsistencies in awards).  
322  See the contributions in KARL P. SAUVANT, APPEALS MECHANISM IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES (2008); and McRae, supra note 319; Gantz, 
supra note 321. 
323  W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL 
ADJUDICATION AND ARBITRATION: BREAKDOWN AND REPAIR 103-06 (1992). 
324  See generally Nicolas Hachez & Jan Wouters, International Investment 
Dispute Settlement in the 21st Century: Does the Preservation of the Public Interest 
Require an Alternative to the Arbitral Model? 22-3 (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven – 
Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, Working Paper No. 81, 2012), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2009327; and ICSID Secretariat, Possible 
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further analyze the reasons why these proposals are unlikely to 
succeed.  Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out the advantages of 
such a system.  The contribution of the AB as an institutional factor 
towards building a coherent jurisprudence in WTO law can hardly 
be overstated.  While other changes in the procedure put in place 
during the Uruguay Round were important, such as the adoption 
of panel or AB decisions by the Dispute Settlement Body through 
the process of reverse consensus, the addition of a permanent 
appellate mechanism could be described as a crucial element in the 
success of the WTO’s adjudicatory mechanism.325  A permanently 
staffed appellate mechanism could deflect criticism with respect to 
the independence and impartiality of the tribunals that is leveled 
against the current system of investment arbitration. 326   As 
mentioned before, coherence is not a virtue in and of itself,327 but it 
has served other areas in international law rather well.  There is 
also no doubt that the introduction of an appellate mechanism 
comes at a cost,328 but one that other systems have found worth 
paying.  
Given that the likelihood of an institutional reform is at this 
time rather small, another mechanism that may bring about greater 
coherence is the use of previous decisions as a form of quasi-
precedent. 329   The arbitral panel in Saipem S.p.A. v. Bangladesh, 
similar to a large number of other decisions,330 recognized on the 
                                                             
Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration 4-5 (Discussion Paper, Oct. 22, 
2004), available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDPublications
RH&actionVal=ViewAnnouncePDF&AnnouncementType=archive&AnnounceN
o=14_1.pdf.  
325  An additional element for the generally positive view of the WTO 
jurisprudence’s legitimacy was the careful jurisprudence of the first wave of 
members of the AB.   
326  Gantz, supra note 321, at 68; Hachez & Wouters, supra note 324, at 23.  
327  See Schultz, supra note 290, at 2.  
328  Santiago Montt, What International Investment Law and Latin America Can 
and Should Demand from Each Other: Updating the Bello/Calvo Doctrine in the BIT 
Generation, 3 RES PUBLICA ARGENTINA 75, 94 (2007). 
329  Other mechanisms exist in that regard, such as the annulment committees 
under Article 2(1) of the ICSID Convention, and the domestic court’s refusal to 
enforce particular awards even though their systemic efficacy is doubtful.  For an 
in-depth analysis of previous decisions used as a form of quasi-precedent, see Tai-
Heng Cheng, Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 30 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 1014, 1021 (2006).  
330  A similar statement can be found in ADC Affiliate Ltd. and ADC & 
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one hand that it was not bound by previous decisions.  However, it 
did point out that  
 
[a]t the same time, it is of the opinion that it must pay due 
consideration to earlier decisions of international tribunals.  
It believes that, subject to compelling contrary grounds, it 
has a duty to adopt solutions established in a series of 
consistent cases.  It also believes that, subject to the specifics 
of a given treaty and of the circumstances of the actual case, 
it has a duty to seek to contribute to the harmonious 
development of investment law and thereby to meet the 
legitimate expectations of the community of States and 
investors towards certainty of the rule of law.331 
 
Jan Paulsson similarly found that there is a growing body of 
coherent jurisprudence in investment disputes when he stated, 
“[t]hat a special jurisprudence is developing from the leading 
awards in the domain of investment arbitration can only be denied 
by those determined to close their eyes.” 332   This has been 
confirmed by empirical studies showing that certain awards enjoy 
greater respect than others and consequently are cited more 
frequently.333  The proposition that there is no de jure precedent in 
                                                             
ADMC Mgmt. Ltd. v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, Award, ¶ 293 (Oct. 
2, 2006) (stating, after pointing out the non-binding nature of previous decisions, 
that “cautious reliance on certain principles developed in a number of those cases, 
as persuasive authority, may advance the body of law, which in turn may serve 
predictability in the interest of both investors and host States.”). 
331  Saipem S.p.A. v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Case No. ARB/05/07, 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional Measures, ¶ 67 
(Mar. 21, 2007).  
332  Jan Paulsson, International Arbitration and the Generation of Legal Norms: 
Treaty Arbitration and International Law, ICCA CONGRESS SERIES NO. 13, 12 (2007). 
See generally Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or 
Excuse?, 23 ARB. INT’L 357 (2007); J. Romesh Weeramantry, The Future Role of Past 
Awards in Investment Arbitration, 25 ICSID REV. 111, 113 (2010) (“[A]ntecedent 
awards in the reasoning of [why] investment tribunals are so frequent that the 
practice has almost become an integral part of the investment arbitration award 
reasoning process”). 
333  Jeffery P. Commission, Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A 
Citation Analysis of a Developing Jurisprudence, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 129, 148-53 (2007) 
(reviewing the role that precedent has played in 207 publicly available decisions, 
awards, and orders rendered since 1972—including decisions rendered by early 
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international investment law has, however, been countered with 
the view that there is a de facto precedent regime.334 
Arbitrators disagree over the issue of precedent, as evidenced 
by the decision in Burlington Resources v. Ecuador.  In that case, the 
divided panel noted, “it has a duty to seek to contribute to the 
harmonious development of investment law, and thereby to meet 
the legitimate expectations of the community of States and 
investors towards the certainty of the rule of law.”335  However, 
one of the panelists found that an arbitrator has a duty to “decide 
each case on its own merits, independently of any apparent 
jurisprudential trend.”336 
Gabriele Kaufmann-Kohler, an arbitrator in the Saipem decision, 
summed up the tendency of international investment law – with a 
different trajectory compared to commercial arbitration, a field in 
which precedent is virtually non-existent 337  – as follows:  “in 
investment arbitration, there is a progressive emergence of rules 
through lines of consistent cases on certain issues, though there are 
still contradictory outcomes on others.”338 
The point here is not to take a position in the debate about the 
value of an (unlikely to be implemented) appellate mechanism, or 
the reasons for or against the use of precedent in the highly 
decentralized system of international investment law.339  However, 
                                                             
ICSID tribunals, ICSID, ICSID (AF), and certain non-ICSID investment treaty 
tribunals); Ole Kristian Fauchald, The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals – An 
Empirical Analysis, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 301 (2008) (analyzing ICSID decisions from 
the past ten years, and indicating that “there is a tendency among ICSID tribunals 
to contribute to a homogeneous development of the methodology of international 
law”). 
334  Cheng, supra note 329, at 100; Lucy Reed, The De Facto Precedent Regime in 
Investment Arbitration: A Case for Proactive Case Management, 25 ICSID REV. 95 
(2010); Andrea K. Bjorklund, Investment Treaty Arbitral Decisions as Jurisprudence 
Constante, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE STATE AND FUTURE OF THE 
DISCIPLINE 265, 270  (Colin Picker et al. eds., 2008) (observing that “an accretion of 
decisions will likely develop a jurisprudence constante—a ‘persisting jurisprudence’ 
that secures ‘unification and stability of judicial activity.’”). 
335  Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/5, Decision on Liability, ¶ 187 (Dec. 14, 2012). 
336  Id. ¶ 187. 
337  Weeramantry, supra note 332, at 112. 
338  Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 332, at 373.  
339  It is worth pointing out, however, that precedent functions as a limitation 
to those who would otherwise be less encumbered to decide according to their 
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both mechanisms have, at least in the case of the WTO, contributed 
to the development not only of a consistent jurisprudence, but also 
the development of overarching principles.  More importantly, this 
finding has held true across a number of treaties.  The wide-
ranging use of the proportionality principle would not have been 
developed in the absence of a permanent appellate mechanism that 
is not dependent on reappointment in any particular dispute.  The 
jurisprudence in the SPS Agreement area may be particularly 
instructive.  The AB has created a coherent jurisprudence involving 
the amount of regulatory space a WTO member has with respect to 
a number of SPS Agreement provisions.  It did so against a number 
of panel decisions that fought a rearguard action holding a rather 
narrow view of what options WTO members have to justify their 
domestic measures.340 
There is little doubt that international investment law has 
matured into a system that has developed or is in the process of 
developing overarching principles.  Instituting an appellate 
mechanism and using precedent are helpful elements in providing 
a basis for a coherent jurisprudence.  Over a period of time, they 
are capable of elucidating such principles with greater force than is 
possible under a fragmented system currently present in 
international investment arbitration.  Conversely, the lack of an 
appellate mechanism or use of precedent are factors that explain 
why international investment law is only beginning to follow the 
footsteps of international trade law. 
 
4.3. Different Epistemic Communities 
 
Another important difference concerns the actors that 
participate in international adjudication.  One’s experience and 
background presumptively have an impact on not only what 
decisions are being made concerning a particular question, but also 
how decisions are made.  Such decision-making involves a number 
of complex considerations, including personal and professional 
                                                             
own sense of what consists of a just outcome.  Precedent would require arbitrators 
to justify their desires to deviate from previous findings.  
340  Wagner, supra note 67, at 197. 
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interests.341  These considerations may not only consist of interests 
advancing the field with one’s own vision in mind of what it 
should look like, or what is best for society in the aggregate, but 
may also consist of the desire to maintain one’s relative position in 
a particular area (e.g. reappointment for a coveted position).   
In this sense the background of an actor, or what epistemic 
community she belongs to, is of great importance.342  Both WTO 
law and international investment law have originated as areas of 
“exotic and highly specialized [knowledge].” 343   To varying 
degrees, the two fields have moved away or are moving away 
from their respective traditional paradigms.  While trade law used 
to be almost entirely dominated by lawyers operating in offices 
equivalent to the United States Trade Representative in the U.S., or 
offices equivalent to the Directorate General in the EU, the trade-
focused concerns exhibited by these actors have been replaced with 
a considerably wider angle incorporating, for example, health or 
environmental concerns. 344   There is a debate currently in 
international investment law over the question to what extent an 
arbitrator’s background has an impact on the decisions she 
renders.345   
                                                             
341  See, e.g., Ratner, supra note 76, at 517 (noting that there is an “arbitral 
culture,” and when arbitators deviate from the traditional arbitrator methodology, 
for unfair procedures and unconvincing opinions, “they have failed” at their 
arbitration  duties).  See generally McRae, supra note 6, at 3-6.  
342  See Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International 
Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1 (1992) (defining epistemic communities as 
consisting of “networks of professionals with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue area.”).  The use of the concept of 
epistemic community does not preclude the possibility that different epistemic 
communities can at least partially converge, nor that individuals can belong to 
more than one epistemic community.  In the context of international investment 
law, see Schill, supra note 32, at 3, 11; Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global 
Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 427, 465-466 (2010); Julie A. Maupin, 
Transparency in International Investment Law: The Good, the Bad, and the Murky, in 
TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 142 (Andrea Bianchi & Anne Peters eds., 
2013), Sergio Puig, Social Capital in the Arbitration Market, 25 EUR. J. INT.’L L. 387 
(2014). 
343  Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising 
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group 
of the International Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, ¶ 8 (Apr. 13, 2006).  
344  See also Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 30, at 519 (noting that “the WTO 
has increasingly ‘opened’ to a common culture of international lawyers.”). 
345  See generally Roberts, supra note 39,  at 85; José Augusto Fontoura Costa, 
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A considerable number of participants in the field of 
international investment arbitration originate from the area of 
commercial arbitration.  That field is characterized by an equality 
of arms between the two sides in arbitration.  Under such a 
paradigm, the question of whether states enjoy a certain amount of 
regulatory space inherently contests fundamental assumptions 
about how arbitration works.346  The challenge that international 
investment law has faced over the last years derives from a wholly 
different framework: public international law.  As public law, the 
field is infused with deference to domestic decisions, paving the 
way for providing regulatory space for states.  Another element 
that separates the two fields is the idea that commercial arbitrators 
decide individual and discrete cases with little or no policy 
implications.  Thus, the dissenting arbitrator in Fraport v. 
Philippines remarked that “the integrity of this interpretative 
process must not be compromised by the pronouncements of other 
arbitral tribunals in their interpretation of different treaties in 
wholly unrelated factual and legal contexts.”347 
Those adjudicators coming from a public international law 
perspective proceed on different assumptions, namely that their 
decisions are contributing towards a global world order.  The 
impact of such a starting point is visible with increasing frequency, 
as more and more individuals cross the “boundary” between these 
epistemic communities.  The much-criticized348 Continental decision 
may serve as an example where one of the arbitrators may have 
had decisive influence in the inclusion of Article XX GATT 
                                                             
Comparing WTO Panelists and ICSID Arbitrators: The Creation of International Legal 
Fields, 1 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES (2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1832382. 
346  Thomas W. Wälde, Procedural Challenges in Investment Arbitration Under 
the Shadow of the Dual Role of the State - Asymmetries and Tribunals’ Duty to Ensure, 
Pro-actively, the Equality of Arms, 26 ARB. INT’L 3, 4-5 (2010); Stephan W. Schill, 
Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Re-conceptualizing the Standard of Review 
Through Comparative Public Law, 3 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 1, 9 et seq. (2012) 
(asserting that “public international law approaches have greater value for 
understanding why states deserve deference” and pointing out that deference is 
rooted in the public law concept of separation of power). 
347  Fraport A.G. Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide v. Republic of the 
Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, Dissenting Opinion of Bernardo 
Cremades, ¶ 7 (Aug. 16, 2007). 
348  See e.g., Footer, supra note 162, at 134; Alvarez & Brink, supra note 297. 
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jurisprudence in the panel’s decision.349  
Stephan Schill has aptly summarized the difference between 
private commercial and public international lawyers, stating: 
 
[They] often have different perspectives on and different 
philosophies about the role of law, the State, and the 
function of dispute resolution.  Also, their audiences and 
conceptual approaches are often different.  Whereas public 
international lawyers embed international investment law 
firmly in general international law and approach the topic 
against that background, commercial arbitral lawyers focus 
on dispute settlement and see investment treaty arbitration 
as a subset of international (commercial) arbitration.350 
 
The traditional paradigm of international investment law posits 
that decisions in one case should not have larger policy 
implications.  However, that paradigm is – in a certain category of 
cases involving the regulatory fabric of a country – no longer valid.  
This is true for cases that rather clearly implicate public policy 
choices.  The foremost current example is the challenge against 
Australia’s measure concerning the plain packaging of cigarettes 
and the decision by Germany to place restrictions on the use of 
coal-fired power plants.351  In such cases it is hard to argue that 
states – especially when a measure has been passed with 
considerable democratic safeguards – should not be accorded 
                                                             
349  For other examples, see Roberts, supra note 39, at 86.  See also 
Commission, supra note 333, at 136 (noting, “[a]s to investment treaty decisions 
and awards emanating from ICSID tribunals, however, the tribunal members are 
no longer ever-changing. Put simply, their backgrounds, qualifications, 
experiences in international law and their regular interactions, both professionally 
and otherwise, have contributed to the development of an esprit de corps 
amongst ICSID and other investment treaty arbitrators.”).  For a fundamental 
critique of the investment law system, including the aspect of the relatively small 
pool of investment arbitrators, see Public Statement on the International Investment 
Regime, 31 August 2010, OSGOODE HALL L. SCH., available at 
http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public_statement and Tom Toulson, Investment 
Treaty Arbitration is ‘Unfair’, Say Academics, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Sept. 10, 2010). 
350  Schill, supra note 32, at 888. 
351  For a number of other cases involving governmental regulatory powers 
see Schill, supra note 32, at 3, 14-15. 
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regulatory space.352 
Marrying public law maxims with a dispute settlement 
community that has, to a significant degree, evolved from 
commercial arbitration creates friction and brings about challenges 
and disputes over the supremacy of interpretative primacy.353  One 
of these frictions lies in the adjustment of expertise that 
adjudicators will have to bring with them.  This requirement of 
adjustment is true for all participants.  Some convincingly argue 
that some commercial arbitrators have an insufficient grounding in 
public international law and appreciation that they are no longer 
refereeing a match that concerns only the disputing parties, while 
some public international lawyers have an inadequate grasp on 
economics, commercial law, and how to conduct proceedings.354  It 
should also be recognized that international investment law is not 
alone in facing such a change or clash of legal culture(s), but that 
other fields – including international trade law – have undergone 
similar challenges.355   
The need for regulatory space may not have been apparent in a 
certain category of international investment disputes at a time 
when the disputes oftentimes concerned discrete governmental 
measures against an investor.  Such disputes more closely resemble 
the paradigm of commercial arbitration – a field that has spawned 
a large number of international investment arbitrators who shaped, 
to a large extent, the ethos that dominated the field of investment 
arbitration for a considerable period of time.  The changing nature 
of investor-state proceedings, and the influx of participants and 
commentators with different paradigms, has led to a changing 
discourse over the extent public policy considerations should play 
in investment arbitration.  Similar developments have taken place 
                                                             
352  But see Wälde, supra note 346 (addressing some procedural challenges 
arising in investment disputes, and suggesting that arbitral tribunals have a duty 
of restoring equality of arms affected by government powers). 
353  Weiler, supra note 140, at 194-97. 
354  Jan Paulsson, Avoiding Unintended Consequences, in APPEALS MECHANISM IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES 241, 262–63, (Karl P. Sauvant et al. eds., 
2008). See generally Schill, supra note 32, at 889; William W. Burke-White & 
Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standard of Review 
in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283, 331 (2010). 
355  Joseph Weiler addresses the difference between the culture under the 
GATT and the WTO in Weiler, supra note 140, at 194–97.  
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in WTO law, which saw a stronger recognition of public policy 
questions, not only between the periods of the GATT and the WTO 
(due to different procedures in the dispute settlement process), but 
also since the inception of the WTO in 1995. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This article shows that international trade and investment law, 
despite their differences, are two closely related fields; and, in 
many ways, constitute two sides of the same coin.  Both areas have 
undergone, or are currently undergoing, considerable changes 
with respect to the degree to which they permit states and WTO 
members regulatory space in determining domestic public policy.  
To show the development of the slow convergence, and how the 
two systems deal with allowing states to make policy decisions in 
such fields as the environment or human health, this analysis 
focused on (1) regulatory expropriations in the case of international 
investment law, and (2) the SPS Agreement and the TBT 
Agreement in the case of WTO law. 
The debate over regulatory space is particularly vigorous in 
international investment law, where the traditional paradigm of 
the protection of investors has had to contend with views that 
favor balancing public policy matters against the need for investors 
to be protected against governmental intrusion.356  Over the last 
years, this development has manifested itself in different schools of 
thought ranging from debates about the legitimacy of the entire 
international investment law enterprise to arguments over the 
public law nature of the field. 
WTO adjudicators have incorporated competing interests into 
their decisions.  Indeed, an overarching jurisprudence across 
different treaties has developed under the WTO umbrella.  Some 
arbitrators have made explicit reference to the jurisprudence of not 
                                                             
356  The stakes in international investment arbitration are rising.  Several 
awards have ranged in more than 100 million dollars, while a number of pending 
cases involve damage claims above one billion dollars.  Joshua B. Simmons, 
Valuation in Investor-State Arbitration: Toward a More Exact Science, 30 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L. 196, 196 (2012).  
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only the WTO, but also other international tribunals such as the 
European Court of Human Rights.  This, of course, does not mean 
there should be a wholesale convergence between international 
investment law and WTO law.  As Mary Footer rightly points out, 
“[t]here are . . . limits on the extent to which WTO jurisprudence 
can be brought into investment arbitration,” and referencing other 
fields of international law should certainly be more than “an 
opportunistic cross-referencing exercise.”357 
This article has taken a different approach in comparing the 
amount of regulatory space, and found that there are indeed 
converging trends in not only the academic discourse between 
investment law and WTO law, but also the jurisprudence in both 
fields. 358   The current development and discourse over 
international investment law is reminiscent of the debates in 
international trade law shortly after the creation of the WTO in 
1995.  This article has laid out some of the factors that explain the 
differences between the two fields.  Some of the factors are textual, 
contextual, and historical.  These reasons certainly do not 
constitute an exhaustive list.  International investment law and 
WTO law have developed from different bases and have had 
different goals.  Another factor that has led to a lack of coherent 
jurisprudence, with respect to taking account of domestic policy 
decisions in international investment law, has an institutional 
basis.  It is unlikely that the current ad hoc system will be replaced 
with an AB-style forum where tenured judges carry out the 
decision-making.359  There may be reasons militating against this 
                                                             
357  Footer, supra note 162, at 138.  
358  Whether, as Debra Steger suggests, trade and investment law should be 
fully integrated or whether the two fields should remain separate is not the point 
of this article.  Steger, supra note 45, at 156.  Others find a dangerous tendency “to 
hyperbolize the influence [of trade law] on [investment law]” or “to 
mechanistically design public policy solutions in international investment law by 
mere transplant of the public policy interpretations, methodological approaches, 
and institutional solutions that have uniquely evolved within international trade 
law . . . [,]” calling those who argue for stronger convergence of rationales—
though not necessarily for wholesale adoption—a “tribe of enthusiasts.”  Desierto, 
supra note 39, at 6-10.  
359  VAN HARTEN, supra note 57, at 180–84.  Cf. Ratner, supra note 76, at 516-20. 
For a view against creating a standing body, see Paulsson supra note 42; SANTIAGO 
MONTT, STATE LIABILITY IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: GLOBAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE BIT GENERATION 155–59 (2009); 
Barton Legum, Options to Establish an Appellate Mechanism for Investment Disputes, 
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approach, but such a position may have to be reviewed now that 
more investment tribunals are moving towards making decisions 
not only with respect to individual cases, but also with respect to 
more generally applicable regulatory policies.  The final reasons 
why international investment law has been less welcoming in 
recognizing domestic policy decisions are the differences between 
the epistemic communities investment and trade law.  While 
international trade law has been somewhat divorced from other 
fields of international law for some time, the distinction for 
international investment law has been more formidable.  This, as 
well as the long-standing tradition of the participants in 
international investment law who have a background in 
international commercial arbitration, is another factor that should 
not be underestimated.  Recognizing the reasons why important 
differences between the two fields remain may help shape the 
discourse over the convergence between international trade and 
investment law. 
This article does not promote the view that substantive 
obligations in international investment law should be rewritten.  
Instead, it argues that some of the jurisprudence developed in 
international trade law as well as the discourse concomitant with 
these changes can serve as a form of blueprint for a future system 
of international investment law that takes these concerns seriously.  
The current system, having focused on individual rights, can 
evolve into one that takes contrasting societal goals seriously, 
while anchoring its collective interpretative exercise in the texts of 
existing investment agreements. 
* * * 
 
 
                                                             
in APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES 231 et seq. (Karl P. 
Sauvant ed., 2008).  See generally on the issue of harmonization of international 
jurisprudence YUVAL SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 113 et seq. (2003); Jonathan I. Charney, Is International Law 
Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?, 271 RECUEIL DES COURS 101 (1998). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
